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Out of Sight, Out of Danger?: Procedural
Due Process and the Segregation of
HIV-Positive Inmates
By

LYNN

S.

BRANHAM*

Are they not excluded from public assemblies and feastdays like
murderers, parricides, fated to be perpetual exiles, and even more
unhappy than these! For murderers are at least permitted to live
with other men; these are driven away like enemies. They are denied the same roof, the same table, the same utensils with others.
Moreover they are barred from the cleansing waters for public usage, and there is fear that even the rivers may be infected with their
malady. If a dog should lap water with a wounded tongue, we
should not consider the water to have been contaminated by the
brute; but let one of these afflicted ones approach it and we believe
the water is rendered impure by this human being.1

Introduction
Although the scourge of leprosy has disappeared from most parts of
the world, what many view as the modem equivalent of leprosy, AIDS,
continues to rampage from person to person, city to city, and country to
country. AIDS was not even identified in this country until 1981,2 but
by August of 1989, according to government figures, it had claimed the
lives of at least 61,655 Americans.3
The statistics on AIDS fatalities in the United States, however, actually mask the enormous dimensions of the health threats posed by AIDS.
Public health officials have estimated that up to one and one-half million
Americans may be infected with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV),
* Associate Professor, Thomas M. Cooley Law School; B.A. 1976, University of Illinois; J.D. 1980, University of Chicago Law School.
1. S. BRODY, THE DISEASE OF THE SOUL: LEPROSY IN MEDIEVAL LITERATURE 80

(1974) (quoting St. Gregory of Nysse) (description of lepers in the Middle Ages).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON
ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 5 (1986) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL'S
REP.].
3. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT 12 (Sept. 1989).
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the virus that causes AIDS.' Although officials are unsure how many of
these seropositive individuals will develop AIDS, present estimates range
from sixty-five to one hundred percent.' In addition, even if some seropositive individuals do not become ill themselves, they may continue to
spread the virus if they do not refrain from what is referred to as "the
exchange of bodily fluids" with others.
The fear of AIDS has prompted hysterical demands by some who
wish to avoid all contacts with persons who have contracted HIV. Children who have tested positive for the virus have been hounded from
schools across the country.' Employers have summarily fired employeesbelieved to be HIV-positive. 7 AIDS-afflicted persons charged with
crimes have languished in jail because of the refusal of jail officials to
transport them to court,' and judges have barred defendants infected
with the virus from their courtrooms, requiring them to enter guilty pleas
and be sentenced over the telephone. 9
The clamoring to isolate those infected with HIV from the
uninfected population has perhaps reached its zenith in the prison setting. Prisons are viewed as potential hotbeds for the spread of HIV because of the high number of incarcerated intravenous drug abusers and
4. Centers for Disease Control, Public Health Service, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Services, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States: A Review of Current
Knowledge, 36 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 14-15 (1987). At least five million people worldwide may already be infected with HIV. 3 AIDS Pol'y & Law (Buraff Pubs.)
No. 11, at 3 (1988).
5. Id., No. 12, at 5 (1988).
6. In one case that attracted much media attention, a school board in Arcadia, Florida
prohibited three brothers, all of whom were hemophiliacs who had contracted HIV, from
attending a public elementary school. After the parents of the boys brought suit against the
school board, an injunction was issued prohibiting the school board from barring the boys
from the school. When the boys began attending the school, however, half of the other students were kept home by their parents. A week later, the trailer where the family of the three
boys lived burned down; the cause of the fire was later determined to be arson. Id., No. 18, at
7 (1988).
7. See, e.g., id., No. 24, at 2 (1989) (reporting on charges filed by the Maryland Commission on Human Relations alleging that a 7-Eleven store required an employee to take an HIVantibody test and forced him to resign when he tested positive). See also id., No. 12, at 6
(1988) (reporting the results of a survey of executives of 1100 companies in Philadelphia in
which 10% said they would fire an employee infected with HIV, 16% wxould not work with
such an employee, and 38% would take steps to limit the amount of contact between the
seropositive employee and other employees).
8. Joint Subcomm. on AIDS in the Criminal Justice System of the Comm. on Corrections and the Comm. on Criminal Justice Operations and Budget, AIDS and the Criminal
Justice System: A PreliminaryReport and Recommendations, 42 REC. OF THE A. OF THE BAR
OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, 921 n.27 (1987).
9. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1988, at A21, col. 1.
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the perceived frequency of sexual contacts between prisoners. 10 As a resuit, not only prison staff members, but many inmates have begun to
demand that seropositive inmates be segregated from the general prison
population." The specter of HIV prison units and even HIV prisons
looms.
The segregation of inmates believed to be HIV-positive raises a
number of constitutional questions. Inmates confined in prison HIV
units have argued, often unsuccessfully, that their confinement impinges
on their equal protection and due process rights as1 2well as their right not
to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.
Another potential constitutional objection to the segregation of seropositive inmates exists, one that focuses not on the segregation policy
itself, but on the procedures used when implementing such a policy. Assuming that the segregation of HIV-positive inmates is otherwise constitutional, a question arises as to what procedural safeguards, if any, must
attend a prisoner's transfer to an HIV unit. This Article focuses upon
that issue. Before turning to that question, however, this Article presents
some basic information about HIV infection-how it is transmitted and
how it is detected.
I.

The Transmission and Detection of HIV Infection

AIDS is caused by a virus known as human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV). 13 This virus weakens the body's immune system, the system
through which the body combats disease. 4 As a result, people with
10. The sharing of a needle with a seropositive intravenous drug-abuser and exchanging
bodily fluids with a seropositive person while engaging in anal, oral, or vaginal sex are the two
primary ways in which the AIDS virus is transmitted. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
11. NAT'L INsT. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 103-04 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter NIJ REPORT].

12. See, eg., Harris v. Thigpen, 727 F. Supp. 1564 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (finding that constitutional rights of inmates were not violated because authorities' actions were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(finding no violation of Eighth Amendment because segregated inmates not denied adequate
food, clothing, or shelter, and finding no violation of Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause because inmates with AIDS are not a suspect class and are not "similarly situated" as
other inmates). But cf Settlement Improves Medical, Psychiatric Carefor CMF Prisoners;
Ends Isolation of HIV Inmates, ACLU NEWS (ACLU of Northern California), March-Apr.
1990 at 2 (reporting on settlement of Gates v. Deukmejian, No. S-87-1636 LKK-JFM (E.D.
Cal.), a prisoners' rights class action suit alleging, inter alia, discriminatory segregation of
HIV-infected inmates in the California Medical Facility at Vacaville).
13. SURGEON GENERAL'S REP., supra note 2, at 9.
14. Id. at 10.
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AIDS are susceptible to and contract diseases that they would not normally contract and from which they eventually die.
Fortunately, the modes of transmission of HIV are limited. Documented cases of transmission have been confined to instances in which an
infected person exchanged blood, semen, or vaginal secretions with an
uninfected person.15 Medical authorities also suspect that HIV may be
transmitted through breast milk. 16
Although only certain bodily fluids have been implicated in the
spread of HIV, the virus has been found in other bodily fluids, including
saliva, tears, and urine. 7 Still, public health officials and the vast majority of doctors emphatically insist that HIV is not transmitted through the
types of nonsexual, casual contacts that occur between people in their
daily lives.'" These views are grounded on the results of a number of
studies of persons living with individuals who have AIDS. 9 None of
these studies revealed any uninfected person becoming infected because
of having had casual contacts with an infected person.2" The absence of
any evidence of the AIDS virus being transmitted through casual contact
is believed by medical authorities to be particularly significant since
many of the uninfected participants in the studies shared eating utensils,
toilets, and even toothbrushes with infected household members.2 1
A person may become infected with HIV by engaging in certain
high-risk behaviors. Sexual activity involving the exchange of semen,
blood, or vaginal secretions with an infected partner is one form of highrisk behavior that may lead to the transmission of the virus.22 The sharing of needles by intravenous drug abusers is also a common mode of
transmission, since infected blood may remain in an unsterilized needle,
permitting the virus to be transmitted to an uninfected drug abuser who
23
subsequently uses the needle to inject himself or herself with drugs.
15. Centers for Disease Control, Public Health Service, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Services, Recommendationsfor Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-CareSettings, 36
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 3 (1987).

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control, Public Health Service, U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Services, PublicHealth Service Guidelinesfor Counseling and Antibody Testing to Prevent HIV Infection and AIDS, 36 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 514 (1987)
[hereinafter CDC HIV-Antibody Testing Guidelines]; AM. HOSPITAL ASS'N, AIDS/HIV INFECTION POLICY: ENSURING A SAFE HOSPITAL ENVIRONMENT 4 (1987) [hereinafter HospiTAL ENVIRONMENT REP.]; SURGEON GENERAL'S REP.,

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

supra note 2, at 13.

SURGEON GENERAL'S REP., supra note 2, at 13; NIJ REP., supra note 11, at 15.
Id.
Id.
SURGEON GENERAL'S REP., supra note 2, at 16.
Id. at 19.
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The virus is also transmitted through transfusions of infected blood or
blood products, and perinatally from a mother to a fetus.24
Infected persons can spread the virus even though they may not
have any symptoms.25 For this reason, the control of the spread of AIDS
has proven particularly difficult. Many asymptomatic HIV carriers are
totally unaware that they are spreading the virus; the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC), the federal agency responsible for disease control, estimated in August of 1987 that most of the one to one-and-a-half million
Americans infected with HIV were unaware of their HIV positivity and
might unwittingly be transmitting the virus to others.2 6 Even when HIV
carriers are aware of their positive status, some persist in engaging in
activities that pose a high risk of transmitting the virus. 2 7 Their potential

victims, duped by the healthy appearance of their sexual or needle-sharing partners, often fail to take the necessary steps to protect themselves.
As a result, more people become infected with the virus, more people
develop AIDS, and more people die.
At present, tests developed to determine HIV status do not detect
the presence of the virus itself in a person. 28 The tests instead are antibody tests, ones that detect whether a person's body has produced certain antibodies in an attempt to thwart the infiltrating HIV. 29 Experts
presume that persons who test positive for HIV antibodies are infected
with the virus and capable of transmitting it.
One problem with antibody tests is that there is a lapse of time between infection with the AIDS virus and the body's discernible production of HIV antibodies. 0 Although most people produce antibodies
within six to twelve weeks after contracting the virus, 31 experts have reported much longer time lapses, ranging up to fourteen months between
24. Id. at 19-20.
25. Id. at 11.
26. CDC HIV-Antibody Testing Guidelines, supra note 18, at 509.
27. See R. SHiLTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON, 198 passim (1987) (recounting the sexual behavior of one seropositive man who, immediately after having sex one time with another
man, showed his partner some purple lesions on his chest and announced, "Gay cancer.
Maybe you'll get it too."); see also 3 AIDS Pol'y & Law (Buraff Pubs.) No. 15, at 2 (1988)
(reporting court martial of a soldier who was seropositive, had unprotected sex with three
other soldiers, and did not tell any of them about his HIV status).
28. See NIJ REP., supra note 11, at 3-4.
29. See id. at 3. Tests for the virus itself are, however, in the process of being developed.
Id. at 3-4.
30. CDCHIV-Antibody Testing Guidelines,supra note 18, at 509-10.
31. Id. at 509.
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32
the date of infection and the time when seropositivity becomes evident.
A person may therefore be an HIV carrier and capable of spreading the
virus, but test negative on an antibody test.
In addition to the possibility of false-negative test results, some persons who are not infected with the virus have tested positive for HIV
antibodies. Under "optimal laboratory conditions," repeat antibody testing, which is recommended by the CDC if a person tests positive on an
initial antibody test, can be at least 99% accurate in identifying persons
who are actually seropositive. 33 But in practice, the percentage of persons falsely identified as seropositive is quite high.34
Not only is there a lapse of time between infection with HIV and
when a person tests positive for antibodies, but there is also a lapse of
time between the infection and the development of AIDS. The CDC
estimates that an average of over seven years will elapse between the time
of HIV infection and the advent of AIDS.35 All persons who are HIV
carriers, however, may not necessarily develop AIDS. Although the
CDC presently estimates that at least 99% of the persons who are HIVpositive will develop AIDS, these estimates may prove to be high. 6
Some HIV-positive persons who do not have AIDS are still not
healthy. Some develop AIDS-Related Complex (ARC), suffering such
symptoms as fever, weight loss, diarrhea, and swollen lymph nodes.37
Many, but possibly not all persons with ARC eventually develop
AIDS. 38 With AIDS comes the potpourri of "opportunistic diseases,"
such as Kaposi's sarcoma, a form of skin cancer, and pneumocystis
carinii pneumonia, from which persons with AIDS may eventually
39
succumb.

32. Quality AIDS Testing: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Regulation and Business Opportunities of the House Comm. on Small Business, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1987) (statement
of Dr. Lawrence Miike) [hereinafter Hearing on AIDS Testing].
33. CDC HIV-Antibody Testing Guidelines, supra note 18, at 510.
34. See infra notes 286-94 and accompanying text.
35. Centers for Disease Control, Public Health Service, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Services, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States, 36 MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 801 (1987). Researchers at the San Francisco Department of Public Health have estimated that the incubation period between the time of HIV infection and the
onset of AIDS may range anywhere from one to thirty-five years. 3 AIDS Pol'y & Law (Buraff
Pubs.) No. 11, at 5 (1988).
36. See supra text accompanying note 5.
37. SURGEON GENERAL'S REP., supra note 2, at 11.
38. NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CAUSE, TRANSMISSION, AND
INCIDENCE OF AIDS 2 (1987).
39. SURGEON GENERAL'S REP., supra note 2, at 10. AIDS is presently considered a fatal
disease. Of the persons diagnosed with AIDS in 1981, at least 90% have died. The fatality
rate for those diagnosed with AIDS in 1984 is 80 percent. NIJ REP., supra note 11, at 7.
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II. Procedural Due Process and the Segregation of
Seropositive Inmates
Legislators and correctional officials have devised a number of different segregation schemes in response to the problem of AIDS. Some
correctional facilities segregate only inmates with AIDS," while others
segregate inmates with AIDS and those with ARC.4 1 Other facilities go

further, also segregating seropositive, but asymptomatic prisoners.42 Still
other correctional institutions are more selective, considering the need
for segregation on a case-by-case basis.43
An analysis of the constitutionality of segregating an inmate because
of his or her HIV status must consider the nature of the segregation
scheme. Is the inmate segregated because he has AIDS or ARC, because
he has tested positive for HIV antibodies, or because he is seropositive
and has engaged in activities posing a substantial risk of spreading the
AIDS virus? Since the segregation of inmates solely because they are
seropositive has engendered the most controversy, on both legal and policy grounds, this Article will focus on procedural due process issues
stemming from this type of segregation.
A. Liberty Interests
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares that the states may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."' The Fifth Amendment contains a
similar prohibition applicable to the federal government.4 Before determining whether the due process rights of a prisoner are violated when the
prisoner is removed from the prison's general population unit because of
40. A survey conducted by the National Institute of Justice in October of 1988 revealed
that 14% of the state and federal prison systems segregated all inmates with AIDS, but only
those seropositive inmates, from the rest of the prison population. NAT'L. INST. OF JUSTICE,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1988 UPDATE: AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 35 (1989) [hereinafter NIJ UPDATE].
41. In October of 1988, 2% of the country's prison systems segregated all inmates with
AIDS or ARC, but not asymptomatic carriers of HIV. Id.
42. Twelve percent of the prison systems in the country reported in October of 1988 that
they segregated all seropositive inmates. Id.
43. In October of 1988, 69% of the state and federal prison systems decided on a case-bycase basis whether to segregate seropositive inmates. Id. Under these ad hoc segregation
schemes, an inmate might be segregated for medical reasons, when continued confinement in
the general prison population could pose an undue risk to an inmate with AIDS or ARC of
contracting a potentially life-threatening infection. Seropositive inmates might also be segregated for other reasons. Promiscuous inmates, for example, might be segregated to prevent
them from further spreading HIV.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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HIV-positivity, one must address the question whether the prisoner has
been deprived of a liberty interest, thereby triggering the protections of
the Due Process Clause. In answering that question, this Article will
consider several Supreme Court cases that discuss liberty interests in the
48
47
46
prison context-Meachum v. Fano, Vitek v. Jones, Hewitt v. Helms,
and Kentucky Department of Correctionsv. Thompson."
1.

Supreme Court Cases

In Meachum v. Fano, several prisoners contended that they had
been deprived of liberty without due process of law when they were
transferred from a medium- to a maximum-security prison in Massachusetts.50 A state statute vested the Commissioner of Corrections with unconfined discretion to decide whether and to what prison an inmate
should be transferred.5 In this case, the prisoners had been transferred
because of their alleged involvement in setting fires at the medium-secur52

ity prison.

Although acknowledging that the conditions at the maximum-security prison were "substantially less favorable" than those at the medium-security prison, 3 the Supreme Court concluded that the prisoners
had not been deprived of a protected liberty interest when they were
transferred from one to the other.5 4 Hence, an analysis of whether the
prisoners had been afforded due process of law was unnecessary.
In concluding that no liberty interests were implicated by the interprison transfers, the Court discussed the two possible sources of pro55
tected liberty interests-the United States Constitution and state law.
The Court observed that no constitutionally derived liberty interest was
at issue, since any liberty interest of a convicted felon sentenced to prison
was abrogated upon conviction to the extent that the state could incarcerate the felon within any prison in the state.5 6 In other words, a convicted felon could not claim any right to be initially placed in any
particular prison since the conviction and the sentence imposed implicitly authorized the state to incarcerate the prisoner in whatever prison
46. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
47. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).

48. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).

49. 109 S.Ct. 1904 (1989).
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

427 U.S. at 222.
Id. at 227 n.7.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 223-27; see Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983).
Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224.
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the state saw fit. Similarly, a prisoner had no recognizable liberty interest in remaining in a particular prison because of the elimination of any
such interest upon conviction.5 7 In the words of the Court,
"[c]onfinement in any of the State's institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to
impose.""8 The fact that the conditions of confinement at the prison to
which a prisoner is transferred are more onerous than those at the prison
in which the priscner was previously confined does not mean that the
prisoner, because of the transfer, has been deprived of a liberty interest
that would require taking steps to ensure that the transfer was
warranted. 9
The Court in Meachum recognized, however, that liberty interests
are not confined to those created by the Constitution; according to the
Court, constraints placed on governmental discretion by state law might
also give rise to a liberty interest. 60 Nonetheless, the Court observed that
the prisoners contesting their transfer in Meachum could not invoke any
state-created liberty interest since under the laws of Massachusetts, the
decision to transfer prisoners fell within the unmitigated discretion of the
Commissioner of Corrections.6 1
Meachum was subsequently distinguished by the Supreme Court in
Vitek v. Jones.62 In Vitek, a Nebraska prisoner contested his transfer
from a prison to a state mental hospital, arguing that the transfer had
been effected without due process of law.63 A state statute authorized
such a transfer upon the finding of a physician or psychologist that a
prisoner had a mental disease or defect that could not be adequately
treated at the prison. 64
57. Id. at 225.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 226.
61. Id. at 226-27 & n.7. The statute provided in relevant part:
The commissioner may transfer any sentenced prisoner from one correctional institution of the commonwealth to another, and with the approval of the sheriff of the
county from any such institution except a prisoner serving a life sentence to any jail
or house of correction, or a sentenced prisoner from any jail or house of correction to
any such institution except the state prison, or from any jail or house of correction to
any other jail or house of correction. Prisoners so removed shall be subject to the
terms of their original sentences and to the provisions of law governing parole from
the correctional institutions of the commonwealth.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 97 (West 1974).
62. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
63. Id. at 484.
64. Id. at 483 & n. 1. The statute provided in relevant part:
When a physician designated by the Director of Correctional Services finds that a
person committed to the department suffers from a physical 'disease or defect, or
when a physician or psychologist designated by-the director finds that a person com-
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The Court noted that this statute confined the state's discretion to
transfer prisoners to state mental hospitals.6 5 Such transfers were contingent on dual findings that the prisoner had a mental disease or defect,
and that he or she needed to be transferred to receive proper treatment.66
As a result, a prisoner had an "'objective expectation, firmly fixed in
state law and official Penal Complex practice,' " that he or she would not
be transferred to a mental institution unless these findings had been
made. 67 This objectively justified expectation gave rise to a liberty interest that in turn subjected the transfer decision to the strictures of due
process.6 8
Even if there had been no state statute in Nebraska conditioning the
transfer of prisoners to state mental hospitals, the Supreme Court would
still have concluded that the Nebraska prisoners were entitled under the
Due Process Clause to certain procedural protections before being so
transferred. That is because the Court also found that, independent of
any state statute, prisoners have a liberty interest in not being transferred
to a state mental hospital without the protection of minimum requirements of due process. 69 The Court noted that while a conviction may
implicitly authorize a prisoner's placement in any penal institution in the
state, the conviction does not mean that a prisoner may be sent to a state
mental institution. ° Confinement in a mental institution, the Court observed, leads to more than the loss of freedom that attends incarceration
in prison.7" As a result of being confined in such an institution, a person
will also suffer the stigma of being labelled mentally ill,72 and may also
be subjected, as the prisoner was in Vitek, to compulsory treatment of his
mental problems.73 Because of these untoward consequences of confinement in a mental institution that do not normally follow from incarceration in prison, the Court concluded that the transfer of a prisoner to a
mental hospital effects a deprivation of liberty subject to the constraints
mitted to the department suffers from a mental disease or defect, the chief executive
officer may order such person to be segregated from other persons in the facility. If
the physician or psychologist is of the opinion that the person cannot be given proper
treatment in that facility, the director may arrange for his transfer for examination,
study, and treatment to any medical-correctional facility, or to another institution in
the Department of Public Institutions where proper treatment is available.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-180(1) (1976).
65. 445 U.S. at 489-90.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting Miller v. Vitek, 437 F.Supp 569, 572-73 (D. Neb. 1977)).
68. Id. at 490-91.
69. Id. at 491.
70. Id. at 493.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 494.
73. Id.
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of due process.74
In Hewitt v. Helms," the Supreme Court was again confronted with
the question whether the transfer of a prisoner from one location to another had infringed on the prisoner's due process rights. The prisoner in
that case challenged his transfer from the general prison population to
the administrative segregation unit pending investigation of his alleged
participation in a prison riot. 76 The prisoner objected to his placement in
administrative segregation because the work, educational, recreational,
and other privileges of those incarcerated in the unit were substantially
curtailed. 7
In addressing the threshold question whether the prisoner's transfer
implicated a liberty interest falling within the protection of the Due Process Clause, the Court dismissed the argument that the Due Process
Clause itself created a liberty interest to remain in the general population. 78 The Court observed that when a person is sentenced to prison, it
is "ordinarily contemplated" that the person at some point may be
housed in sections of a prison with less favorable conditions.79 Since
placement in administrative segregation is well within the conditions of
confinement that prisoners should "reasonably anticipate" sometime
during the time they are incarcerated, no constitutionally derived liberty
interest is affected by a prisoner's placement in administrative
segregation.80
The Court went on, however, to conclude that the state had created
a protected liberty interest by enacting certain statutes and regulations
constraining correctional officials' discretion to place prisoners in administrative segregation.8 1 The Court identified two factors underlying this
conclusion.8 2 First, the pertinent statutes and regulations required that
certain procedures be followed when a prisoner was transferred to administrative segregation. 83 One statute, for example, mandated the giving of a designated notice to inmates confined in administrative
segregation while an investigation of their alleged misconduct was con74. Id.; see also Washington v. Harper, 58 U.S.L.W. 4249, 4252 (1990) (inmate has a
constitutionally derived liberty interest in avoiding the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs).
75. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
76. Id. at 463-64.
77. Id. at 479 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 466-68.
79. Id. at 468.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 471-72.
Id.
Id.
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ducted.84 The statute also commanded that any such investigation commence immediately upon the inmate's confinement, and specified when
inmates not involved in misconduct must be released from the special
unit." In addition, a regulation of the state's correctional department
outlined certain instances when a person confined in administrative segregation was to be afforded a hearing complying with certain statutory
6
requirements.
The second factor identified by the Court was the presence of substantive state law provisions dictating when a prisoner could be sent to
administrative segregation.8 7 One of what the Court called "specified
substantive predicates,"88 such as " 'the need for control'" or " 'the
threat of a serious disturbance,' " had to exist before correctional officials
could transfer a prisoner to administrative segregation."9
Since Hewitt v. Helms, the Supreme Court has further elaborated on
when actions of the state create a liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause. Of particular importance is the Court's decision in Kentucky Departmentof Correctionsv. Thompson. 90 In that case, Kentucky
inmates challenged the constitutionality of the procedures that the prison
administration followed when restricting inmates' visiting privileges.
The inmates contended that due process mandated they be afforded additional procedural safeguards before their visiting privileges were suspended or revoked.9 1
84. Id. at 470 n.6.

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 472. The court in Hewitt discussed the following Pennsylvania statutes governing administrative segregation:
An inmate who has allegedly committed a Class I Misconduct may be placed in
Close or Maximum Administrative Custody upon approval of the officer in charge of
the institution, not routinely but based upon his assessment of the situation and the
need for control pending application of procedures under § 95.103 of this title.
37 PA. CODE § 95.104(b)(1) (1978).
An inmate may be temporarily confined to Close or Maximum Administrative Custody in an investigative status upon approval of the officer in charge of the institution
where it has been determined that there is a threat of a serious disturbance, or a
serious threat to the individual or others. The inmate shall be notified in writing as
soon as possible that he is under investigation and that he will receive a hearing if any
disciplinary action is being considered after the investigation is completed. An investigation shall begin immediately to determine whether or not a behavior violation has
occurred. If no behavior violation has occurred, the inmate must be released as soon
as the reason for the security concern has abated but in all cases within ten days.
Id. at § 95.104(b)(3).
88. 459 U.S at 472.
89. Id. at 470 n.6, 471-72 (quoting the statutes at issue).
90. 109 S. Ct. 1904 (1989).
91. Id. at 1907.
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The debate before the Court centered on the question whether certain state prison regulations and policies created a liberty interest in visiting privileges that would trigger due process safeguards. One of the
pertinent policies of the Kentucky Bureau of Corrections provided that
"[c]ertain visitors who are either a threat to the security or order of the
institution or nonconducive to the successful re-entry of the inmate to the
community may be excluded." 92 The policy then listed some of the
grounds warranting the exclusion of a visitor from a correctional facility.9 3 The policy made it clear, however, that the list was not an exhaus94
tive one.
In an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the Court observed that
for a state-created liberty interest to exist, the state must have placed
"'substantive limitations on official discretion.' "91 The Court noted that
96
these limitations might be imposed by the state in a variety of ways,
the most common entailing two steps. 97 The state first establishes "substantive predicates" or criteria that delimit the way in which official discretion is to be exercised, 98 and then requires that a certain decision be
made if the criteria are found to exist. 99
Applying this two-part test to the regulations and policies governing
visiting privileges that were at issue in the case before it, the Court concluded that they did not create a liberty interest falling within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the regulations and
policies outlined certain "substantive predicates" or bases for excluding
visitors from a correctional institution, they did not require a visitor's
92. Id. at 1906 n.1.
93. Id.
94. The policy provided as follows:
Certain visitors who are either a threat to the security or order of the institution or
nonconducive to the successful re-entry of the inmate to the community may be excluded. These are, but not restricted to:
A. The visitor's presence in the institution would constitute a clear and probable
danger to the institution's security or interfere with the orderly operation of the
institution.
B. The visitor has a past record of disruptive conduct.
C. The visitor is under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
D. The visitor refuses to submit to search, if requested to do so, or show proper
identification.
E. The visitor is directly related to the inmate's criminal behavior.
F. The visitor is currently on probation or parole and does not have special written
permission from both his or her Probation or Parole officer and the institutional
Superintendent.
95. Thompson, 109 S. Ct. at 1909 (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249
(1983)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983)).
99. Id.
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exclusion if the predicates were met.'°° A visitor falling within one of the
categories could be excluded from the institution, but did not have to be.
In addition, visitors not falling within any of the categories could be denied entry into a correctional facility, since the list of excludable visitors
was not a comprehensive one. The Court therefore concluded that because of the language of the regulations and policies governing visiting
privileges, inmates could not reasonably believe that they could force
prison officials to abide by them.101 The inmates' claim that the regulations and policies created a liberty interest was therefore without

merit. 102
Ironically, the test set forth in Thompson for state-created liberty
interests may not have been met in either Vitek v. Jones10 3 or Hewitt v.
Helms.'04 The statutes and regulations discussed in those cases provided
that an inmate "may" be transferred to a mental hospital or to an administrative segregation unit if certain requirements were met, but the regulations did not mandate that such transfers occur.1" 5 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court concluded in both cases that the governing statutes and
regulations gave rise to a protected liberty interest. 10 6 The results in
these two cases seem to conflict with the Court's subsequent admonition
in Thompson that for statutes or regulations to create liberty interests,
they must contain "the requisite relevant mandatory language." 10 7 The
statutes or regulations must "requir[e] that a particular result is to be
reached upon a finding that the substantive predicates are met." 108
Nevertheless, Vitek and Hewitt can be reconciled with Thompson.
The statutes and regulations at issue in Vitek and Hewitt, when specifying when transfers to a mental hospital or administrative segregation
might be ordered, implicitly indicated when such transfers would be prohibited. The "substantive predicates," such as the requirement in the
Nebraska statute (Vitek) of a mental disease or defect for which treatment is unavailable in the prison, or the "need for control" in the Pennsylvania statute (Hewitt), would have to be present for a transfer to be
permissible. The statutes and regulations were thus, in a sense,
mandatory, because they implicitly mandated that no transfers occur un100. Id. at 1910.
101. Id. at 1911.
102. Id.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

445 U.S. 480 (1980); see supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
459 U.S. 460 (1983); see supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
The applicable statutes and regulations are cited supra in notes 64 and 87.
Vitek, 445 U.S. at 489-90; Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472.
Thompson, 109 S. Ct. at 1910.
Id.
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less the conditions set forth in the statutes and regulations were present.
In the words of the Court in Thompson, the prisoner in Vitek could "reasonably expect" that he would not be transferred to a mental hospital
unless he suffered from a mental disease or defect for which he could not
receive appropriate treatment in prison. 0 9 Similarly, the prisoner in
Hewitt could "reasonably expect" that he would not be transferred to
administrative segregation unless one of the preconditions outlined in the
regulations for such a transfer existed.
2. Segregation of Seropositive Inmates-Deprivationof a Liberty Interest?
This Article next explores the question whether a liberty interest is
implicated when a prisoner is transferred to administrative segregation
because of his or her seropositivity. Two issues are subsumed within that
question: first, is a constitutionally derived liberty interest affected by
such a transfer, and second, is a state-created liberty interest at stake?
These issues will be discussed in turn below.
a. Deprivation of a Constitutionally Derived Liberty Interest?
Prison officials would obviously point to Meachum v. Fano1' 0 and
Hewitt v. Helms II' in support of their argument that asymptomatic seropositive inmates have no constitutionally derived right to remain in the
general population. Citing Meachum, they would argue that a conviction implicitly authorizes the confinement of a prisoner in a portion of a
prison or even in a special prison for medical reasons; such confinement,
112
in other words, is "within the normal limits or range of custody."
Since confinement in an AIDS unit is a form of administrative segregation, prison officials might also parrot the Court's remarks in Hewitt that
prisoners should "reasonably anticipate" being placed in administrative
segregation sometime during their period of incarceration. 113
Vitek v. Jones," 4 however, arguably supports the contrary argument
that inmates transferred to a special unit solely because of their seropositivity can invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause. The inmate
who brought suit in Vitek had also been transferred for medical reasons,
yet the Supreme Court concluded that the transfer implicated a liberty
interest.1 5 According to the Court, a conviction alone did not give the
109. Id. at 1911.
110. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
111. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
112. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225.
113. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468.
114. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
115. Id. at 494.

308

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 17:293

state license to subject a person to the "stigmatizing consequences" of
being labelled mentally ill, and to require him to receive unwanted
mental health treatment.11 6 Similarly, it could be argued with some force
that a conviction alone does not permit a state to subject a person to the
"stigmatizing consequences" of being labelled an HIV carrier, and to institute quarantine measures opposed not only by the prisoner but perhaps
by medical authorities as well.117
To be sure, prison officials would contend that Vitek is distinguishable. They would note that the Court in Vitek took pains to emphasize
that two factors underlay the Court's conclusion that a prisoner transferred to a mental hospital had been deprived of a liberty interest-both
the stigma attending such a transfer and the "mandatory behavior modification" to which a prisoner transferred to a mental institution would be
subjected. ' Nowhere in its opinion does the Court suggest that the
onus of being labelled mentally ill through a transfer to a mental hospital
will suffice to create a liberty interest.
On the flip side, however, Vitek did not say that the onus of being
labelled mentally ill when transferred to a mental institution will not suffice to create a liberty interest. The Court simply did not address the
issue of the sufficiency of this type of stigma to the finding of a liberty
interest because it did not have to, and also probably because it did not
want to unless necessary. Had the Court held that the stigma of being
labelled mentally ill because of one's isolation with others who are mentally ill would suffice to trigger the protections of the Due Process
Clause, its opinion would potentially have had a more far-ranging impact
than has its more narrow ruling. Not only could a prisoner transferred
to a mental institution invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause,
but so might a prisoner transferred to a mental health unit within the
prison itself. Through its carefully chosen language, the Court avoided
commenting on the constitutional significance of the latter type of
transfer.
Despite the Court's commendable restraint in refusing to proffer
views on an issue not before it, it would seem that the result in Vitek did
not and should not have hinged on the fact that the prisoner transferred
to the mental institution was subjected to compulsory psychiatric treatment. Had the prisoner been involuntarily transferred to a mental institution where he was not subject to compulsory psychiatric treatment, he
would still have been deprived of a liberty interest.
116. Id.
117. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
118. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494.
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In Vitek, the Court rationalized its conclusion that a prisoner transferred to a mental institution and subjected to involuntary psychiatric
treatment is deprived of a liberty interest by observing that "[s]uch consequences visited on the prisoner are qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime."" 9 A
conviction, without more, therefore does not implicitly authorize the infliction of those consequences on a prisoner. Similarly, involuntary confinement in a mental institution, as a result of which one may forever
after be labelled "crazy," is a consequence different in kind from those
customarily experienced by persons convicted of a crime; a conviction
may officially denominate a person as criminally inclined, but not necessarily as mentally ill. Otherwise, persons, upon conviction, could be
summarily carted away to mental institutions.
What is in effect the quarantining of seropositive prisoners also arguably inflicts consequences upon those prisoners that are "qualitatively
different" from those normally attending a criminal conviction. Not only
are such prisoners isolated from the general prison population as are inmates transferred to a mental hospital, but they also suffer stigma, the
effects of which can equal or surpass the stigmatizing consequences of
being categorized as mentally ill.
News stories are replete with accounts of the discrimination faced
by identified carriers of the AIDS virus.1 20 Persons whose seropositivity
has become known have been fired, evicted, kicked out of school, assaulted, and otherwise socially isolated and scorned. 1 21 Many have lost
their medical insurance,' 22 a particular concern since so many will incur
monumental medical expenses while they are ill. Like their seropositive
counterparts on the outside, prisoners have been vilified because of their
seropositivity by both prison staff and other prisoners. 123 Indeed, some
prisoners have even rioted in an attempt to enforce their demands that
seropositive prisoners be isolated.' 2 4
119. Id. at 493.
120. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., 3 AIDS Pol'y & Law (Buraff Pubs.) No. 22, at 7 (1988) (describing lawsuit
alleging that insurance company denied application for disability insurance after testing the
applicant's blood sample for HIV without his consent); id., No. 15 (1988) at 8 (describing
health insurance program of one convenience store chain that excludes from coverage any
employee with AIDS who contracted the disease other than from his or her spouse or through
a blood transfusion).
123. AIDS AND THE LAW 241 (H. Dalton, S. Burris & Yale Law Project eds. 1987).
124. See, e.g., Belgian PrisonersMutiny to Demand Transfer of AIDS Sufferers, Reuters
Ltd., May 2, 1987 (available on NEXIS) (reporting riot of 100 Belgian prisoners demanding
the transfer of inmates with AIDS).
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Prison officials would probably rejoin, however, that Hewitt has already resolved that confinement in administrative segregation for nondisciplinary reasons is envisioned when a prison sentence is imposed.1 2 5
Since prisoners should "reasonably anticipate" placement in administrative segregation sometime during their terms of incarceration, no liberty
interest is implicated by a transfer to administrative segregation,
126
whatever the reason for the transfer.
Even assuming, however, that the Court in Hewitt was not misguided in its assessment of the implications of the transfer to administrative segregation at issue in that case, Hewitt arguably does not and should
not govern transfers of seropositive prisoners to AIDS units pursuant to
a blanket policy of isolating such prisoners from the general prison population. To be sure, Hewitt justified transfers to administrative segregation
to protect the transferred prisoner's safety or to protect other prisoners
from the prisoner who was transferred,12 7 but prison officials also might
purport to justify the segregation of seropositive inmates on the grounds
that such segregation is necessary to protect the transferred inmates from
being killed by inmates fearful of contracting AIDS, 12 " or to protect
other inmates or staff from becoming infected with the virus. Protective
impulses also generally underlie the transfer of mentally ill prisoners to
mental hospitals. If such prisoners remained in prisons where they could
not receive adequate mental health care, they might pose a threat to their
own or others' safety. Yet the Supreme Court in Vitek still concluded
that placement in a mental institution falls outside the authorized confines of a prison sentence.1 29 In other words, persons sent to prison, even
if mentally ill, would not "reasonably anticipate" summary placement in
a mental institution as part of the sentence imposed. Consequently,
before being transferred to a mental institution, prisoners are entitled to
the benefit of certain procedural protections designed to ensure that such
institutionalization is indeed warranted.
Because of the Vitek decision, the claim that seropositive prisoners
transferred as a matter of course to AIDS units or prisons have been
deprived of a liberty interest cannot be summarily dismissed with the
argument that prisoners should "reasonably anticipate" at the time they
are sent to prison being subjected at some later time to more restrictive
125.

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983).

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Prison Cell of AIDS-Exposed Inmate is Burned, United Press Int'l, Feb 18, 1987
(available on NEXIS) (reporting burning of seropositive inmate's cell by other inmates who
learned of his HIV status).
129. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980).
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confinement for nonpunitive reasons. Rather, Vitek suggests that the
reasons for and the nature of the administrative confinement need to be
examined to determine if the mal-effects of the confinement are different
in kind, rather than simply in degree, from the types of adverse consequences that normally attend many forms of administrative confinement."' 0 If the detrimental consequences of the, administrative
confinement are sufficiently different from those experienced by most
prisoners segregated from the general prison population for administrative reasons, then a prisoner so confined will have been deprived of a
liberty interest and be entitled to the protections of due process.
Proponents of the segregation of seropositive inmates would probably point out that the removal of sick inmates, particularly the carriers of
infectious diseases, from the general prison population is a routine practice in the nation's prisons. 13 1 Consequently, they would argue, the medical segregation of seropositive inmates who are capable of transmitting
HIV does not inflict the type of unusual and cataclysmic consequences
that would support the finding of a liberty interest.
Nevertheless, the segregation of asymptomatic, seropositive prisoners can be distinguished from the frequent transfer of sick inmates to the
prison infirmary for medical care and treatment. First of all, asymptomatic, seropositive prisoners may not be sick in the sense that they need
medical care or treatment.13 2 To the extent that medical treatment in the
1 33
form of medication is available to guard against the onset of AIDS,
this medication can, like most medication prescribed for inmates, be dispensed to them in their cells or during a brief visit to the prison infirmary. To argue that the segregation of seropositive inmates implicates
no liberty interest because transfers of inmates for medical reasons are
quite common is therefore disingenuous, since transfers of inmates who
are not presently sick, who cannot readily infect others, and who can
easily receive any needed medication through standard prescription drug
distribution procedures are not common at all.
130. Id. at 493.

131. See

NAT'L COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, STANDARDS

FOR

HEALTH SERVICES IN PRISON 35 (1987) (requiring that prisons develop procedures for handling inmates with communicable diseases, including provisions for isolation of such inmates

when "medically indicated") [hereinafter STANDARDS].
132. SURGEON GENERAL'S REP., supra note 2, at 11.
133. The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases has recommended that the
AIDS-fighting drug AZT be made available to asymptomatic HIV-infected persons who have
low T4 cell levels. 4 AIDS Pol'y & Law (Buraff Pubs.) No. 16, at 1-2 (1989). Clinical trials

have revealed that the administration of AZT to such individuals may substantially delay the
onset of AIDS or ARC. Id.
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Second, the segregation of HIV-positive inmates in a special unit of
a prison inflicts consequences not only different in degree, but different in
kind from the consequences that generally ensue when sick prisoners are
housed in the prison infirmary. When inmates are transferred to the
prison infirmary for medical care and treatment, their stay will generally
be temporary and often for only a short period of time; when they recover, they will usually be transferred back to the general prison population. By contrast, if a prison adopts a policy of segregating seropositive
inmates, this so-called "medical segregation" will continue as long as the
prisoners remain incarcerated, perhaps for many years or even a prisoner's lifetime.
In addition, a prisoner transferred to a prison infirmary usually will
not be stigmatized by the transfer. Such maladies as a broken leg, a lacerated forehead, or a diseased heart simply do not invite the opprobrium
of a sexually transmitted disease. In any event, even if a prisoner were
sent to the infirmary for treatment of a disease such as syphilis, the diagnosis would normally be kept confidential,13 4 so the prisoner could generally avoid the stigmatic effects that occur when one is known to have a
venereal disease.
A seropositive prisoner transferred to an AIDS unit, on the other
hand, cannot avoid these stigmatic effects since the transfer itself serves
to disclose the prisoner's HIV status. In addition, the revelation that a
prisoner is HIV-positive would likely be considered more stigmatizing
than the disclosure that a prisoner has some other sexually transmitted
disease. Because HIV is communicable and AIDS is presently virtually
always fatal,'" 5 the specter of the disease will engender more fear and
even hysteria than will the accusation that a person has some other nonfatal and perhaps curable sexually transmitted disease. The stigma that
attends one's identification as a carrier of the AIDS virus is further aggravated by the fact that HIV disease has thus far been mainly concentrated in two groups traditionally disfavored by society as a wholehomosexuals and intravenous drug abusers. 136 Consequently, when a
prisoner is segregated because of HIV-positivity, the prisoner may be further scorned as assumptions are drawn about the prisoner's sexual
proclivities or use of illegal drugs.
The third reason that the mass segregation of seropositive prisoners
cannot be treated as simply one of many forms of special confinement for
134. See STANDARDS, supra note 131, at 44 (mandating confidentiality of medical records).
135. See supra note 39.
136. NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CAUSE, TRANSMISSION, AND
INCIDENCE OF AIDS 3 (1987).
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medical reasons is that the decision to segregate asymptomatic, seropositive inmates has not been, and in the future will likely not be, a medical
decision. 137 While prison doctors normally decide whether or not a prisoner needs to be housed in a prison hospital unit for medical reasons,
doctors are not the ones instituting mass segregation policies. In fact,
because of the limited ways in which the AIDS virus is transmitted, most
medical authorities are adamant in their opposition to the isolation of
individuals, whether inside or outside prison, simply because of their
13

HIV-positivity. 1
The decision to segregate seropositive inmates has been a policy,
rather that a medical, decision. This policy question has often been considered by legislatures despite the opposition not only of medical authorities but of correctional authorities as well. 139 Accordingly, while one
might blithely attempt to lump the segregation of seropositive inmates
with other medical confinement decisions, a closer examination reveals
critical distinctions between the segregation decision, which is made by
legislatures or correctional officials, and other decisions made by doctors
concerning the medical care and treatment of ill prisoners. Although
prisoners can safely assume that at some point while they are incarcerated they will be hospitalized for medical reasons, they should not necessarily "reasonably anticipate" "medical" isolation that is not medically
indicated, is extremely stigmatizing, and will last the duration of their
prison sentences.
Vitek confirms that even transfers of prisoners that are medically
based may effect a deprivation of a liberty interest."4° Under the statute
before the Court, transfers of prisoners to mental institutions occurred
only upon the recommendation of a physician or a psychologist. 1 ' Yet
the Court concluded that the consequences of being transferred to a
mental institution were onerous enough and different enough from those
normally experienced by prisoners to require that prisoners transferred
to such institutions be afforded the benefits and protections of due
137. See NIJ UPDATE, supra note 40, at 36.
138. See, e.g, AM. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH

SERVICES Ass'N CORRECTIONAL INFORMATION BULLETIN: ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 10 (1988); NAT'L COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, POL'Y STATEMENT REGARDING THE ADMIN.

MANAGEMENT OF INMATES WITH HIV POSITIVE TEST RESULTS, ARC, OR AIDS 2 (Nov. 8,

1987).
139. See, e.g., Gongwer News Service Rep. No.102, at 5 (May 26, 1988) (reporting opposition of Michigan Department of Corrections to proposed legislation to segregate all HIV-positive prisoners).
140. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980).
141. Id. at 483 n.1.
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So, too, are the consequences of being segregated in the AIDS unit
of a prison. In fact, in some ways, the adverse consequences of being
confined in a special AIDS unit are greater than those experienced by
prisoners confined in a mental hospital. First, while a seropositive inmate will never become nonseropositive, and thus eligible for release
from the AIDS unit, mentally ill prisoners can be returned to prison once
they become well or their mental problems become controllable. Thus,
prisoners confined under a mass segregation policy will often be incarcerated in special AIDS units much longer than mentally ill prisoners are
confined in mental hospitals.
In addition, the stigmatizing effects of being labelled HIV-positive
are arguably greater than those suffered by prisoners officially categorized as mentally ill. The pronouncement that a prisoner is mentally ill
and must be transferred to a mental hospital will likely come as no surprise to correctional staff, other prisoners, and even family members,
who will often have deduced from the prisoners's aberrational behavior
that he or she has mental problems. The decision to transfer the prisoner
to the mental institution will only put an official imprimatur on a diagnosis fully anticipated by others. The stigmatizing consequences of this official action are therefore somewhat limited.' 43
By contrast, since one's HIV status is not readily apparent to others,
most people will be unaware that a person is seropositive. Consequently,
if seropositive prisoners are transferred to a special AIDS unit in a
prison, the stigmatizing consequences of being identified as HIV-positive
will be attributable to the government's actions in transferring the
prisoners.
In Muhammad v. Carlson,"4 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed a prisoner's claim that his transfer to an AIDS unit violated
his procedural due process rights, and rejected the argument that a constitutionally derived liberty interest was at stake. 14 5 The court stated
that any stigma arising out of the transfer was due to the public's fears,
many of which are irrational, about the disease and was not attributable
to the government. 146 This view of liberty interests, however, if adopted
by the Supreme Court, would have doomed the prisoner's claim in Vitek.
The stigma that attaches when one is officially denominated mentally ill
142. Id. at 493-94.
143. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 601 (1979).
144. 845 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1988).

145. Id. at 178-79.
146. Id. at 178.
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also "arises primarily from public fear of, and misunderstanding about,
the disease."' 4 7 Yet the Supreme Court in Vitek underscored the significance of this stigma to its conclusion that a prisoner was deprived of a
liberty interest when transferred to a mental institution.14 8 In addition,
there is a bit of irony in the Eighth Circuit's cavalier dismissal of the
significance of the stigma of being identified as HIV-positive by the government on the grounds that this stigma is really the product of unfounded public fears, since governmental quarantine decisions will
certainly help to produce, encourage, and flame such fears.
This criticism of Muhammad v. Carlson is not meant to imply that
the stigma engendered by governmental action will by itself effect a deprivation of a liberty interest. Whether rightly or wrongly, the Supreme
Court in Paul v. Davis rejected that notion.'4 9 In that case, the plaintiff
contended that he was deprived of liberty without -due process of law
when law enforcement officials listed the plaintiff as an "active shoplifter" and included his photograph in a flyer distributed to local
merchants. 150 At the time the flyer was distributed, the plaintiff had not
been, nor was he ever, convicted of shoplifting.1"5 ' But despite the obvious disrepute that follows when one is labelled a thief, the Court found
that the plaintiff had not been deprived of any liberty interest protected
152
by the Due Process Clause.
In explaining its decision, 15 the Court distinguished its previous
analysis in Wisconsin v. Constantineau.154 The plaintiff in Constantineau
brought suit against a police chief after the police chief had had notices
posted in all local stores where liquor was sold announcing that no alcoholic beverages were to be sold to the plaintiff for one year. l5 5 The plaintiff maintained that through this governmental action, resulting in her
being labelled an alcoholic, she was deprived of liberty without due process of law.' 5 6 The Court agreed, observing that
[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at
stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and
an opportunity to be heard are essential. "Posting" under the Wisconsin Act may to some be merely the mark of illness, to others it
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980).
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
Id. at 695.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 708-09.
400 U.S. 433 (1971).
Id. at 435.
Id. at 434-36.
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is a stigma,
an official branding of a person. The label is a degrad15 7
ing one.
One might wonder why circulating notices that in effect announce
that a person is an alcoholic deprives that person of a liberty interest
while circulating notices that describe a person as a thief does not. The
Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis attempted an explanation by pointing out
that the governmental action at issue in Constantineau had done more
than stigmatize the plaintiff.'
Because of the notices distributed to iquor stores, the plaintiff had also lost the "right" that she had had previously to buy liquor.15 9 By contrast, the allegedly calumnious notices at
issue in Davis had at most stigmatized the plaintiff; despite the circulation of the notices, the plaintiff could still shop and avail himself of all of
the rights that he held under the laws of the state.
Davis thus stands for the proposition that a person stigmatized by
actions of the government has not necessarily been deprived of a liberty
interest. According to the Court, the person must have suffered some
additional loss before he or she will be afforded the protections of the
Due Process Clause.' 6 What additional loss is necessary is the problematic question.
In Davis, the Court in its discussion of the additional loss suffered by
the plaintiff in Constantineau emphasized that the plaintiff had been deprived of a "right" that she had previously enjoyed under state law-the
right to buy liquor."' Prison officials defending a suit challenging the
mass segregation of seropositive inmates would presumably focus on this
language, pointing out that prisoners often have no "right" under the law
of a state to remain in a particular prison or part of a prison. It follows,
the officials would argue, that such segregation effects no deprivation of a
liberty interest since segregation at most stigmatizes prisoners and deprives them of privileges that they enjoy only at the pleasure of correctional officials.
This line of thinking is misguided, however, for several reasons.
First, to have the finding of a liberty interest hinge on whether the stigma
engendered by governmental action is accompanied by the loss of a
"right" or a "privilege" is to resurrect the much-maligned "right-privilege" distinction that once governed the Court's handling of due process
claims, but that has since been explicitly and emphatically rejected by the
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 437.
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976).
Id. at 708.
Id. at 711-12.

161. Id. at 708.
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Court.16 2 As the Court has recognized, to extend the protections of due
process to the loss of "rights" alone inadequately guards against the arbitrary and abusive exercise of governmental authority that the Due Process Clauses were designed to avert.16 3
Second, to require the loss of a state-created right before a constitutionally derived liberty interest will be recognized confuses constitutionally derived liberty interests with the quite distinct state-created liberty
interests. As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has recognized that
state-imposed substantive limitations on the discretion of government officials may lead to the creation of a liberty interest.'64 But determining
whether enough substantive constraints have been placed on official decisionmaking to create a liberty interest seems closely allied with deciding
whether the government has deprived a person of a right. Consequently,
the focusing on the deprivation of "rights," if appropriate at all, would
appear best suited to the inquiry whether a deprivation of a state-created
liberty interest has occurred.
The question remains whether the mass segregation of seropositive
prisoners does anything more than stigmatize the prisoners since, according to Paul v. Davis,165 stigmatization alone will not support the finding
that a person has been deprived of a liberty interest. The obvious answer
to that question is "yes." Prisoners who have been segregated because of
their HIV-positivity have complained about the onerous conditions of
their confinement as compared to the conditions existing in the general
prison population units. 166 Certain common threads permeate the complaints of these prisoners. They have almost unifoimly claimed that as a
result of their segregation, their freedom of movement within the prison
has been substantially curtailed. 167 Because of this limited mobility, their
work, educational, and recreational opportunities have been substantially
reduced. 168 This inhibition of their educational and work opportunities
may in turn affect their prospects for parole, since a favorable work or
school record enhances their chances of being released on parole. Other
complaints abound, with segregated, seropositive prisoners protesting
such segregation effects as limited visiting privileges, curtailed opportunities to worship with other prisoners, and restricted access to prison li162. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
163. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331-32 (1986).
164. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.

165. See supra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9, 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also cases cited
in NIJ REP., supra note 11, at 100; and NIJ UPDATE, supra note 40, at 47-48.
167. AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 123, at 241.

168. Id.
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braries, including law libraries.1 69 It would seem then that the
stigmatizing effects of being officially characterized as a carrier of HIV
and the substantially less favorable conditions of confinement that generally attend incarceration in an HIV unit of a prison should lead to a
finding that the mass segregation of seropositive inmates deprives them
of liberty, thereby entitling them to the protections of due process.
The somewhat more difficult question is whether the concentration
of all HIV-positive prisoners in one prison where only such prisoners are
incarcerated implicates a liberty interest. It is possible that since those
prisoners might not be thought to pose a risk of transmitting the AIDS
virus to any uninfected prisoner,170 they would be afforded the same privileges that are afforded prisoners in the general population units in other
prisons in the prison system. Such a possibility seems remote, however,
since correctional officers and staff probably would fear the threat of
contagion. The same mentality, or lack thereof, that would prompt the
mass segregation of seropositive inmates in the first place would likely
lead correctional officials to capitulate to those fears and severely restrict
the freedom of movement and privileges of inmates incarcerated in HIV
prisons.
b. Deprivation of a State-Created Liberty Interest?
Whether seropositive -inmates transferred to a special AIDS unit of a
prison as part of a mass segregation policy have been deprived of a statecreated liberty interest will depend on the language of the pertinent statutes and administrative provisions governing such transfers. Most likely,
however, a state-created liberty interest will be implicated by such a
transfer.
Statutes dealing with the segregation of all HIV-positive inmates
might mandate such segregation. Prison officials would not be left with
the option of not implementing a mass segregation scheme. Thus, "substantive limitations" would be imposed on the discretion of prison officials, limitations that are necessary before a state-created liberty interest
can be found. 171 The prison officials would have to segregate seropositive
inmates, and they could not segregate uninfected inmates in the HIV
unit.
169. Id.; NAT'L

AIDS

GAY RIGHTS ADVOCATES & NAT'L LAWYERS GuILD AIDS NETVORK,

A LEGAL AND EDUCATIONAL GUIDE VII-6 (2d ed. 1988).
170. But see infra note 202 and accompanying text.
171. Oim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); see also Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 1909 (1989).
PRACTICE MANUAL:
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Even if a statute or regulation were couched in language simply permitting such mass segregation of seropositive inmates, an argument exists that a liberty interest would still be implicated if the segregation of
seropositive inmates were instituted pursuant to the statute or regulation.
If a statute said, for example, that the director of the department of corrections "may" direct the segregation of all seropositive inmates, the statute would in effect be saying that inmates have the right not to be placed
in the HIV unit unless they test positive for the AIDS virus. Under such
a statute, HIV-negative inmates would have more than a "unilateral expectation" or hope that they would not be shunted off to the HIV unit of
the prison; rather, they would have "a legitimate claim of entitlement"
not to be transferred to that unit unless they met the statutory condition
for such a transfer. 172
The Supreme Court's analysis of state-created liberty interests in
Vitek v. Jones 173 supports the view that the authorized mass segregation
of HIV-positive inmates under state law may create a liberty interest,
even if the language of the pertinent statute or regulation is permissive
rather than mandatory. In Vitek, the statute controlling the transfer of
prisoners to mental hospitals provided in part as follows:
When a physician designated by the Director of Correctional Services finds that a person committed to the department suffers from a
physical disease or defect, or when a physician or psychologist designated by the director finds that a person committed to the department suffers from a mental disease or defect, the chief
executive officer may order such person to be segregated from
other persons in the facility. If the physician or psychologist is of
the opinion that the person cannot be given proper treatment in
that facility, the director may arrange for his transfer for examination, study, and treatment to any medical-correctional facility, or
to another institution in the Department of Public Institutions
where proper treatment is available.' 74
Although the decision to transfer a mentally ill prisoner to a mental hospital fell within the director's discretion under the statute, the Court still
found a liberty interest rooted in state law because a prisoner in the state
had an " 'objective expectation, firmly fixed in state law and official Penal
Complex practice,' that a prisoner would not be transferred unless he
suffered from a mental disease or defect that could not be adequately
172. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7
(1979) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
173. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
174. Id. at 483 n.l (emphasis added) (quoting NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-180(l) (1976).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 17:293

treated in the prison." 175 Similarly, even if correctional officials had the
option under state law of instituting or not instituting a policy of segregating all HIV-positive inmates, and chose to adopt such a policy, prisoners would have an "objective expectation, firmly fixed in state law and
official penal practice" that they would not be segregated in the HIV unit
unless they were infected with the AIDS virus. Consequently, a transfer
of a prisoner to a special AIDS unit in a prison as part of a mass segregation policy would in all likelihood deprive the prisoner of not only a constitutionally derived liberty interest but a state-created one as well.
B.

Procedural Safeguards

Deciding that inmates transferred to administrative segregation because of their seropositivity have been deprived of a liberty interest is
only the first step in the constitutional inquiry, for the Due Process
Clauses do not wholly proscribe deprivations of liberty. If they did, the
malefactions of criminals would often go unpunished by the government.
What the Due Process Clauses prohibit are governmental deprivations of
liberty effected without due process of law. In the words of the Supreme
Court, we must therefore determine "what process is due"1' 76 when
asymptomatic, seropositive inmates are isolated from the rest of the
prison population.
The Court has enunciated several general principles when analyzing
the dictates of due process. First, the Court has said that a fundamental
requirement is that the person being deprived of an interest protected by
the Due Process Clause receive notice of and an opportunity to object to
the government's deprivatory action.1 77 Such notice and opportunity to
object are considered essential in guarding against unfounded governmental deprivations of life, liberty, or property.
Second, the Court has emphasized that affording an opportunity to
object to the government's action means providing an "opportunity to be
heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' ",178 If the
person aggrieved by the actions of the government is able to voice opposi175. Id. at 489-90 (quoting Miller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. 569, 572-73 (D. Neb. 1977)); see
also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), discussed supra in notes 81-89 and accompanying
text. In Hewitt, the applicable regulation said only that a prisoner "may" in certain circumstances be transferred to administrative segregation. Id. at 463 n. 1 See supra note 87 (Pennsylvania statutes).
176. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
177. Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985); Memphis Light, Gas
& Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13 (1978).
178. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
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tion only perfunctorily to what is really afait accompli, then the protection from arbitrary governmental action afforded by the so-called
opportunity to object is only illusory.
Finally, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that due process is a flexible concept, and that its meaning will depend on the context
in which its protections are invoked. 7 9 Consequently, the procedures
adopted by the government to ensure the reliability of decisions made
effecting deprivations of interests protected by the Due Process Clauses
will not necessarily have to mirror the types of elaborate procedural safeThe exact procedures required will
guards attending criminal trials.'
depend instead on the results of applying the balancing test propounded
by the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.' Under this test, the following
three factors are considered and weighed:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail."8 2
Before considering what procedural safeguards must attend the
transfer of a prisoner to an HIV unit of a prison, one must resolve the
question of the extent to which a prisoner's seropositivity must be confirmed before his or her transfer to an HIV unit. Some prison officials
would presumably contend that a summary transfer of a prisoner suspected of being seropositive is constitutional provided that at some point
following the transfer, steps are taken to confirm the prisoner's seropositive status. Prisoners transferred to HIV units, on the other hand, would
probably argue that some sort of hearing at which a prisoner's seropositivity is established must precede the prisoner's transfer to an HIV unit.
Resolution of the question raised by this debate requires the weighing of
the three factors outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge.
1.

The Private Interest at Stake

The first factor to be considered under the Court's due process balancing approach is the private interest affected by the governmental action"SS-here, the private interest at stake is the prisoner's interest in
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See, eg., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560 (1974); Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481.
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 335.
Id.
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remaining in the general prison population unit rather than being confined in the prison's HIV unit.
Prison officials would dismiss the significance of this interest by
pointing to Hewitt v. Helms.I8 4 In Hewitt, the Court addressed the question of what procedural safeguards must attend a prisoner's transfer to
administrative segregation. In answering this question, the Court observed that the prisoner's interest in remaining in the general population
unit was "not one of great consequence" since the prisoner was "merely
being transferred from one extremely restricted environment to an even
more confined situation."1 5 Likewise, prison officials would probably
contend, the interest affected by a prisoner's transfer to an HIV unit is
"not one of great consequence" since the prisoner is merely being transferred from one restricted environment to an even more confined one.
The transfer of a prisoner to an HIV unit, however, can be distinguished from the confining of a prisoner in a conventional administrative
segregation unit as was done in Hewitt. First, a prisoner transferred to
an HIV unit will suffer the opprobrium of being labelled an AIDS carrier. This label will in turn cause many to treat the prisoner as a pariah-a person to be scorned, shunned, and avoided. The end result may
be prisoners whose marriages and other family and social ties have disintegrated, whose future job prospects upon release have vanished, and
whose ability to acquire housing and health insurance upon release from
prison is impeded because they have been typecast as HIV-positive.
The stigmatic effects of being labelled an AIDS carrier will be further exacerbated because of the ways in which the AIDS virus is usually
transmitted.186 Most people will assume that the inmates confined in the
HIV unit are either drug addicts or gay; consequently, such inmates will
then face additional contempt, ridicule, and differential treatment when
confronted by members of a society which not only condemns drug abuse
but is largely homophobic.
By contrast, prisoners placed in traditional administrative segregation units to protect themselves or others do not suffer stigma in the
amount or with the frequency that accompanies placement in an HIV
unit. Prisoners' confinement in administrative segregation normally will
not affect the willingness of others in the future to associate with them or,
upon release, to hire, house, or insure them. And even if a prisoner is on
occasion somewhat stigmatized by a transfer to administrative segregation, such stigmatization does not automatically attend such transfers, in
184. 459 U.S. 460 (1983); see supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.

185. Id. at 473.
186. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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contrast to transfers to HIV units, since so many different reasons may
prompt a prisoner's placement in administrative segregation. For example, inmates may be removed from the general prison population because
prison officials are concerned for their safety, a reason that would hardly
cause most people to spurn the segregated inmates.
That the stigma attending an inmate's transfer to an HIV unit
would be considered significant by the Supreme Court when assessing the
private interest affected by such a transfer is apparent from the Court's
8 7 in which the Court emphasized the absence of
discussion in Hewitt,"
any stigma accompanying a transfer to administrative segregation in
Pennsylvania prisons. 8' In depreciating the importance of the private
interest at stake in Hewitt, the Court also took pains to note that there
was no evidence that confinement in administrative segregation would
have any "significant effect" on an inmate's parole prospects.18 9 By contrast, it is conceivable that some states will conclude that the release of at
least some seropositive prisoners, such as those convicted of rape and
other sex offenses, should be deferred as long as legally possible. These
inmates will have a particularly acute interest in ensuring that the determination of seropositivity is a reliable one.
In addition, prisoners transferred to an HIV unit most likely will
lose coveted work assignments, and their educational opportunities often
will be diminished.190 As a result, their chances of procuring parole release may be lowered by their inability to demonstrate that they are
ready to take on the responsibilities of the outside world. In addition, the
prisoners may lose the opportunity to earn good-time credits for their
91
participation in work and educational programs.1
Prison officials might rejoin that although prisoners transferred to
administrative segregation may forfeit jobs or school placements, the
Court in Hewitt was still unimpressed with the private interest affected
by a prisoner's transfer to administrative segregation. 192 The degree,
however, to which a prisoner's placement in an HIV unit will interfere
with work and educational opportunities and in turn a prisoner's parole
prospects will generally be much greater than the interference which results when prisoners are subjected to more traditional forms of administrative segregation. For example, under the prison regulations at issue
in Hewitt, prisoners had to be released from administrative segregation
187. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 473.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 123, at 241.
191. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.571.3B (West 1981).

192. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 473.
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within ten days unless they were charged with a disciplinary infraction
and confined in segregation pending a disciplinary hearing.19 3 By contrast, under a prison policy of segregating seropositive prisoners, seropositive inmates will be confined in an HIV unit as long as they are in
prison, which for some prisoners will be for the rest of their lives.
The more extended confinement of prisoners in HIV units will make
more substantial their interest in avoiding transfers to such units, not
only because of the impact that this confinement may have on their
chances of being released on parole, but also because of the longer period
of time that they will suffer the loss of privileges enjoyed by the general
prison population. As discussed earlier, similarities abound among the
complaints of prisoners confined in HIV units. 194 These prisoners have
almost uniformly complained about curtailed visiting privileges, limited
access to prison libraries, including law libraries, the dearth of recreational activities, and the loss, upon transfer, of educational and work opportunities. 9 ' While the Supreme Court may have been willing to
cavalierly ignore these kinds of negative consequences when a prisoner
will be confined only temporarily in administrative segregation, these
consequences make more weighty the private interest at stake when prisoners will experience the more onerous conditions of confinement for the
duration of their stay in prison.
Another distinction between confinement in an HIV segregation
unit and the type of administrative segregation experienced by the prisoner in Hewitt is that a seropositive prisoner, once having contracted the
AIDS virus, is unable to take any steps through which he or she can
avoid confinement in the HIV unit. By contrast, the prisoner in Hewitt
was transferred to administrative segregation because of his suspected
involvement in a prison riot, clearly conduct within his control.' 9 6 To
the extent that a prisoner can readily avoid the deleterious consequences
of administrative segregation, the gravity of the harm ensuing from such
segregation is less significant.1 97 In other words, the private interest with
which the government interferes is less weighty than the private interest
affected when a prisoner is confined in administrative segregation for an
immutable characteristic over which he or she now has no control.
193. Id. at 470 n.6.
194. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
195. Id.
196. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 463-64.
197. Cf. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (observing, in a fourth amendment case, that the intrusiveness of a police officer's use of deadly force
to apprehend a fleeing burglar is diminished because the suspect can forestall this use of force
by complying with the officer's direction to halt).
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Prison officials might argue, however, that seropositivity is a condition over which prisoners have control. They can avoid contracting the
AIDS virus by refraining from the high risk activities, such as homosexual sexual encounters and sharing of needles when using intravenous
198
drugs, through which the virus is spread.
This facile view of prisoners' ability to avoid confinement in an HIV
unit ignores the fact that most prisoners unwittingly become infected
with the virus before their incarceration in prison.1 99 Many of these individuals are probably unaware of or do not fully appreciate the risks of
becoming HIV-infected when they engage in the activities through which
the virus is transmitted. 2' To suggest that these prisoners, not fully understanding the risks of AIDS to which they are exposing themselves and
probably not anticipating their future incarceration, have the same ability to avoid administrative segregation as does the prisoner who punches
a correctional officer in the nose is to ignore the difference between intentionally assuming a risk and inadvertently encountering a risk.
A final reason a prisoner might have a greater stake in avoiding confinement in an HIV unit than in avoiding other types of administrative
segregation is that he or she may face a greater chance of contracting
HIV when confined in that unit than when confined in the general prison
population. Prisoners identified as seropositive might assume that they
have nothing to lose by engaging in sex with other seropositive prisoners.
In fact, however, medical experts have indicated that repeated exposures
to HIV may enhance the risk that seropositivity will eventually
culminate in AIDS.2 °1
In addition, prisoners transferred to an HIV unit may not actually
be HIV carriers; they may simply have been incorrectly identified as seropositive.2 °2 If these nonseropositive prisoners then voluntarily or involuntarily engage in high risk activities with prisoners who are actually
HIV-positive, the nonseropositive inmates may become infected for the
first time with HIV and eventually die from AIDS.
198. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
199. NIJ REP., supra note 11, at 29-31 (reporting data suggesting low rates of transmission
of HIV in prison).
200. JOINT COMM. ON AIDS IN THE CRIM. JUSTICE SYS. OF THE COMM. ON CORRECTIONS AND THE COMM. ON CRIM. JUSTICE OPERATIONS AND BUDGET OF THE A. OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., AIDS AND THE CRIM. JUSTICE Sys.: A FINAL REP. AND RECOMMENDATION 92 (1989) (citing the difficulty of locating intravenous drug abusers and edu-

cating them about HIV transmission).
201. 3 AIDS Pol'y & Law (Buraff Pubs.) No. 19, at 10 (1988).

202. See infra notes 286-94 and accompanying text.
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The extent to which prisoners will have a greater chance of contracting HIV because of their isolation in an HIV unit and the concomitant effect on the weight of the private interest at issue will depend on
several factors. Prison officials can diminish the risk by, for example,
taking steps to ensure that the results of HIV tests are reliable. They can
also educate prisoners about the risks, even when they are already seropositive, of having sex with other inmates in the HIV unit. And, of
course, they can take precautions to ensure that prisoners do not have
the opportunity to engage in the sort of high-risk activities that will further expose them to the AIDS virus. If the precautions taken confine the
prisoners in their cells virtually all day, however, the harm inflicted on
inmates confined in HIV units will be exacerbated, accentuating the significance of the private interest at stake when prisoners are transferred to
those units.
For a number of reasons, then, the private interest affected by a prisoner's transfer to an HIV unit is much more substantial than the interest
of the prisoner in Hewitt in avoiding confinement in administrative segregation. As compared to the prisoner in Hewitt, prisoners transferred to
HIV units will suffer greater stigma and face a more substantial risk that
their parole prospects will be impaired. They will also be forced to endure for a much longer period of time than the prisoner in Hewitt the
onerous conditions of confinement that customarily attend administrative segregation. In addition, while the prisoner in Hewitt could presumably have avoided the government's interference with his interest in
remaining in the general prison population by refraining from rioting,
seropositive prisoners can do nothing to forestall their transfer to an HIV
unit when a prison policy is in effect requiring the isolation of all seropositive inmates. Finally, the consequences of being transferred to an
HIV unit will be particularly severe, certainly more so than those experienced by the prisoner in Hewitt, if prisoners become infected with the
AIDS virus or develop AIDS because of the risks to which they were
exposed in an HIV unit.
2.

The Risk of an Erroneous Deprivation of the Private Interest and the
Value of Additional Safeguards

The degree of risk that a prisoner will be erroneously deprived of his
interest in remaining in the general prison population unit and not being
transferred to an HIV unit depends on the particulars of the prison segregation policy. Obviously, if prison officials summarily transfer homosexuals and drug addicts to an HIV unit and only later test them for HIV,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation will be great. In 1987, the Centers
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for Disease Control reported that the prevalency of HIV antibodies
among homosexual and bisexual men ranged from 10% to 70%, depending on the part of the country where the tests were conducted.20 3 The
percentage of intravenous drug abusers testing positive for the HIV antibody has reached as high as 50% to 65% in New York City and surrounding areas, but is below 5% in most other areas of the country.2" If
similar seropositivity rates exist among prisoners, a policy of segregating
all prisoners who are homosexuals or intravenous drug abusers would
ensnare a high percentage of prisoners who are not actually HIVpositive.
Prison officials inclined to segregate seropositive inmates would
likely opt to segregate a prisoner in an HIV unit only after an HIV test
has been administered and yielded a positive result.20 5 Constitutional
problems might arise, however, if a single positive result on an HIV-antibody test were enough to prompt such a transfer. Medical authorities
agree that repeat testing is necessary in order to be confident that a person initially testing seropositive is indeed seropositive.2 °6 At present, the
medical consensus is that a person must test positive two different times
on an antibody test known as the enzyme immunoassay (EIA or ELISA)
and then test positive on an antibody test known as the Western blot
before the conclusion that the person is seropositive can be considered
reliable.20 7
Assuming that HIV-antibody tests are conducted under "optimal
laboratory conditions," the extent to which false-positive and false-negative readings are eliminated by repeat antibody testing is revealed by the
following chart:
203. Centers For Disease Control, Public Health Service, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Services, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States, 36 MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 801 (1987).

204. Id.
205. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 500.054 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (authorizing segregation
of inmates testing positive for HIV).
206. Hearing on Aids Testing, supra note 32, at 22-23 (statement of James R. Carlson);
HOSPITAL ENVIRONMENT REP., supra note 18, at 16 (1987).

207. CDC HIV-Antibody Testing Guidelines,supra note 18, at 510.
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Predictive Value of Positive HIV-Antibody Tests in Hypothetical
Populations with Different Prevalences of Infection

Repeatedly reactive
enzyme immunoassay
(EIA)+
Repeatedly reactive EIA
followed by positive
Western blot (WB)t

Prevalence of
Infection

Predictive Value
of Positive Test*

0.2%
2.0%
20.0%
0.2%
2.0%
20.0%

28.41%
80.16%
98.02%
99.75%
99.97%
99.99%

* Proportion of persons with positive test results who are actually infected with HIV.

+ Assumes EIA sensitivity of 99.0% and specificity of 99.5%.
t Assumes WB sensitivity of 99.0% and specificity of 99.9%.208

This data confirms the value of repeat testing in ensuring that people
are accurately categorized as either seropositive or nonseropositive. Deciding whether such repeat testing is constitutionally mandated before a
prisoner is transferred to an HIV unit, however, requires scrutiny of the
third factor to be taken into account in the procedural due process balancing analysis 2° 9-the governmental interests furthered by isolating seropositive inmates and the extent to which those interests would be
adversely affected by requiring positive readings on several HIV-antibody
tests before a prisoner could be transferred to an HIV unit.
Before turning to an examination of this factor, however, we need to
recognize that prisoners transferred to HIV units will demand more in
terms of procedural safeguards than just repeat antibody testing preceding such transfers. As noted earlier, the reliability of HIV-antibody tests
can be quite high if the tests are repeated following an initial positive
result and are performed under "optimal laboratory conditions."2 '
Studies have revealed, however, that testing conditions and procedures
are often less than "optimal," leading to high false-positive as well as
false-negative rates.2 11
The potentially high false-positive rates will cause prisoners to contend that before they are transferred to an HIV unit because they tested
positive for HIV antibodies, they must be afforded the opportunity to
challenge the accuracy of the test results. To ensure that this opportunity is a meaningful one, prisoners might claim entitlement to a pot208. Centers for Disease Control, Public Health Service, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Services, Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-CareSettings, 36
MOR3IDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 14 (1987).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 181-82.
210. See supra text accompanying note 208.
211. See infra notes 282-94 and accompanying text.
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pourri of procedural safeguards, such as (1) notice of and access to the
test results before the transfer; (2) a formal hearing at which the reliability of the test results could be challenged; (3) additional HIV antibody
tests, paid for by the government when the prisoner is indigent;2 12 (4) the
opportunity to present the testimony of witnesses and documentary evidence; (5) the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses on
the issues of the prisoner's HIV status and the procedures followed to
determine that status; (6) the assistance of a lawyer or other qualified
expert in contesting the test results; and (7) notice of the above rights.
Each of the above safeguards could enhance the reliability of the
transfer-decisionmaking process. The question, however, is whether the
benefit reaped from a particular procedural safeguard is outweighed by
its cost; the resolution of this question requires an examination of the
third factor considered under the due process balancing test.
3. Governmental Interests
The governmental interests factor2 13 has two component parts: first,
the governmental interests furthered by the government's actions depriving someone of an interest falling within the protection of the Due Process Clause,2 14 and second, the burdens on the government, including the
adverse effects on the interests alluded to above, which will follow if additional procedural safeguards are put in place.2 15
Prison officials will argue that the segregation of HIV-positive inmates is necessary to prevent those inmates from infecting other inmates
and correctional staff members with the virus. This interest in protecting
the health of inmates and correctional officials, the prison officials will
maintain, is a particularly compelling one since many if not all persons
who contract HIV will develop AIDS, and since AIDS is at present generally fatal.21 6
Prison officials may also invoke institutional security in defending
their actions. Officials most likely will argue that seropositive inmates
need to be isolated from the rest of the prison population for their own
protection and to prevent prison disruptions. This argument will rest on
the assumption that if seropositive inmates remain in the general prison
population and their seropositivity becomes known to other prisoners,
they may be attacked and even killed.
212. Cf Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (indigent inmate defending against paternity
suit was entitled to blood grouping test paid for by the state).
213. See supra text accompanying note 182.

214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See suDra note 39 and accompanying text.

330

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 17:293

Few will quarrel with the notion that the governmental interests in
protecting inmates and staff from a lethal disease and in maintaining institutional security are extremely important. Yet the importance of the
interests served by actions impinging on individual liberty does not necessarily mean that the government can act in a summary fashion in furtherance of those interests. This is particularly true when the
impingement on individual liberty is great, the risk of erroneous government action is high, and certain safeguards could substantially reduce the
risk without unduly burdening the interests purportedly underlying the
government's actions.
Let us turn, then, to the question of the effect of certain procedural
safeguards on the governmental interests underlying a policy of segregating seropositive inmates. -As mentioned earlier, one dispute between
prison officials and the segregated prisoners might center on the need for
confirmatory antibody testing before a prisoner's transfer to the HIV
unit. Some prison officials no doubt would argue that requiring such
repeat testing before a prisoner's transfer would undermine the interests
served by the transfer. While awaiting the results of further antibody
tests, a seropositive prisoner could infect other inmates or correctional
staff members with the AIDS virus. In addition, other inmates might
learn of the test results and try to eliminate any perceived risk to themselves by killing the inmate who initially tested seropositive.
Prisoners could respond, however, that a policy under which prisoners are immediately transferred to HIV units as soon as they have tested
positive on one HIV-antibody test would actually subvert the institutional goals of protecting inmates and correctional staff from harm and
of maintaining institutional security. If such a policy were implemented,
prisoners remaining in the general prison population might assume that
they were free of HIV. They might then dispense with all caution and
participate in the types of activities through which the virus is spread.
As mentioned earlier, however, people may be infected with the
AIDS virus and yet test negative.21 7 Consequently, a policy of immediately transferring prisoners to an HIV unit as soon as they have tested
positive on one antibody test will leave some prisoners in the general
prison population who are actually infected with the virus and can transmit it. To the extent then that an immediate transfer policy lulls prisoners remaining in the general prison population into a false sense of
security and diminishes their incentive to avoid activities posing a risk of
217. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.

Winter 1990]

OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF DANGER

spreading HIV, the spread of the contagion within the prison population
will be facilitated rather than forestalled.
Prisoners would also most likely point out that the risk of seropositive prisoners transmitting HIV to correctional staff during the time between the initial positive test results and the confirmatory tests is
extremely low. In fact, prisoners would argue, the risk that seropositive
prisoners will ever infect correctional staff with the virus is quite low.
The AIDS virus is not airborne and, as mentioned earlier, is not
transmitted through the types of casual encounters that typify everyday
life, such as talking to someone or shaking hands.2 18 Instead, the virus
follows unique routes into the body, generally entering via contaminated
needles shared with intravenous drug abusers, contaminated blood during blood transfusions, contaminated semen, blood, or vaginal secretions
during anal, oral, or vaginal sex, and perinatally during pregnancy.2 19 It
is unlikely that correctional staff will be shooting drugs with inmates or
having sex with them. Therefore, the chances that they will contract the
virus from a prisoner are very low. These risks are further diminished
when the relevant time period of potential exposure to HIV is the short
of the initial positive test results and the retime between the obtaining 220
sults of the follow-up tests.
Prison officials may argue that inmates are often injured during
fights and scuffles with other inmates or correctional officers and that an
injured seropositive prisoner might bleed on and spread the AIDS virus
to a correctional officer involved in or intervening in a fight. A report of
the Centers for Disease Control recounting three instances in which
health-care workers apparently contracted HIV from patients whose
blood had come in contact with the health-care workers' skin lends some
support to this argument.2 2 ' In each one of these cases, however, the
health-care worker had fairly extensive contact with the blood of a seropositive patient.222 In one case, the health-care worker had the blood on
her chapped hands for twenty minutes. 223 In the second case, the hands
and forearms of the health-care worker were 'saturated with contami218. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
219. SURGEON GENERAL'S REP., supra note 2, at 16, 19-21.
220. The entire laboratory screening process in the military testing program takes three

days to complete. Hearingon AIDS Testing, supranote 32, at 13 (statement of Colonel Donald
S. Burke).
221. Centers for Disease Control, Public Health Service, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Services, Update: Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infections in Health-Care Workers Exposed
to Blood of Infected Patients, 36 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 285 (1987)
[hereinafter Update: HIV in Health-Care Workers].
222. Id.
223. Id.
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nated blood, and she may have touched a patch of skin on her ear where
she had dermatitis. 224 And in the third case, the patient's blood splashed
into the health-care worker's face and mouth.2 25
Although a few health-care workers have apparently contracted the
AIDS virus through exposure of their broken skin or mucous membranes
to HIV-infected blood, the risk that they will become infected from their
patients is considered quite low. In studies conducted by the CDC, the
National Institute of Health, and the University of California, of 435
health-care workers who had open wounds or mucous membranes exposed to HIV-infected blood, none became infected.2 26 Even when
health-care workers had been exposed to HIV-infected blood through
needlestick or other puncture wounds, which would heighten their risk of
contracting the virus, 227 only a small number later tested positive. Of the
812 health-care workers in the CDC, NIH, and California studies who
were exposed to HIV through needlestick or other puncture wounds,
only four seroconverted.2 28
It would seem that health-care workers, who are constantly exposed
to the blood of patients when extracting blood samples and when touching bleeding patients, face a greater risk of contracting HIV through exposure to infected bodily fluids than do correctional officers.22 9 Indeed,
not one case has been documented in which a correctional staff member
has become HIV-infected from an inmate, although many correctional
officers are regularly doused with the saliva, urine, and feces of unruly
inmates. 230 The risk that correctional officers might somehow contract
the virus because a seropositive inmate was not segregated while repeat
antibody tests were conducted is palpably low and provides weak support
for dispensing with confirmatory testing before a prisoner is transferred
to an HIV unit.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 286.
226. NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RISK OF INFECTION WITH THE
AIDS VIRUS THROUGH EXPOSURES TO BLOOD 2 (1987) [hereinafter RISK OF INFECTION]; see

also 4 AIDS Pol'y & Law (Buraff Pubs.) No. 12, at 6-7 (1989) (reporting findings of Centers
for Disease Control's Cooperative Needlestick Surveillance Group that of 1,449 health-care
workers exposed to HIV-infected blood, none of those with mucous membrane exposures became seropositive).
227. Update: HIV in Health-Care Workers, supra note 221, at 287.
228. RISK OF INFECTION supra note 226, at 2 (1987).

229. The risk that a health-care worker exposed to HIV-infected blood will seroconvert has
been estimated at less than I% and may be as low as .4%. 4 AIDS Pol'y & Law (Buraff Pubs.)
No. 12, at 6 (1989).
230. NIJ REPORT, supra note 11, at 22.
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The argument that an immediate transfer to an HIV unit is warranted once an inmate tests positive on one HIV-antibody test because
that inmate might be harmed by other inmates who learn of his or her
seropositivity also lacks force. Prison officials can avoid this potential
problem by simply taking steps to ensure the confidentiality of the preliminary test results.2 3 '
Since requiring confirmatory antibody testing before a prisoner is
transferred to an HIV unit would not greatly undermine the government's interest in maintaining institutional security and preventing the
spread of AIDS, and indeed might further the latter interest, the third
factor considered under the due process balancing test points towards
constitutionally requiring confirmatory testing before such a transfer. As
noted earlier, however, prisoners will insist on procedural safeguards extending far beyond confirmatory testing. 3 2 The impact of these safeguards on the governmental interests purportedly served by the transfer
of seropositive inmates to HIV units needs to be examined.
The safeguards of notifying inmates of and letting them see their test
results before a transfer and providing them with a written notice
describing any rights that they might have during the transfer process
would not encumber the governmental interests underlying the transfer
of seropositive prisoners to HIV units. In fact, letting an inmate review a
laboratory report stating that he or she is seropositive would help to ensure that these governmental interests are indeed being served-that is,
that the prisoner being transferred is actually the prisoner who tested
HIV-positive. Affording inmates these rights would not be overly burdensome from either a cost or an administration standpoint, particularly
since inmates can be provided with both types of notice at the same time.
Delivering notices to prisoners in their cells or rooms, whether notices
about disciplinary hearings 233 or other administrative transfers, 34 is part
of the prison routine.
231. The prison officials themselves may not even have access to this information. One
expert testified before Congress that because ELISA test results are often inaccurate, a laboratory should not even report the positive results of an ELISA test until a confirmatory Western
blot test has been performed. Hearing on AIDS Testing, supra note 32, at 21 (statement of
Patricia A. Watson).
232. See supra text following note 211 (sought-after safeguards might include notice of and
access to test results, a hearing to challenge results, additional tests, presentation of evidence
and witnesses, cross-examination, right to counsel or other expert assistance, and notice of the
above rights).
233. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974), the Supreme Court held that a
prisoner who will lose good-time credits if found guilty of a disciplinary infraction must receive
written notice of a pending disciplinary charge at least 24 hours before the disciplinary hearing
where the charge will be adjudicated. In dicta, the Court observed that the procedures mandated by due process, including written notice, must be extended to prisoners who may be
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The other procedural safeguards soughby prisoners, on the other
hand, would entail substantial costs. If the transfer of a prisoner who has
tested positive three times on HIV-antibody tests and is truly seropositive
were deferred pending additional testing and a hearing en the question of
the inmate's HIV status, the primary purpose of such a transfer, protecting the health of other inmates and correctional staff, could be somewhat
subverted. If seropositive inmates remained in the general prison population pending the execution of these procedures, they could further spread
the AIDS contagion.
This risk, as mentioned earlier, would also be present if inmates testing positive on one ELISA test remained in the general prison population
pending confirmatory tests. The risk that a prisoner is actually HIVpositive and will transmit the virus is greater, however, when the prisoner has tested positive not only on one, but on three antibody tests.
Consequently, the government's interest in protecting the health and
safety of other inmates and correctional staff through the isolation of
seropositive prisoners would be accentuated at this point. In addition,
the delay attending even further testing and a formal hearing would be
longer than the relatively short time involved in conducting a second
ELISA test and a Western blot test.2 35 This extended delay would increase the likelihood of seropositive prisoners spreading the virus to
others between the time of the initial test and the time of transfer to an
HIV unit. As a result, the more elaborate procedural safeguards advocated by prisoners would arguably pose a greater threat to the government's interest in curtailing the spread of AIDS than would the
administration of more routine confirmatory tests before a prisoner's
transfer to an HIV unit.
The additional procedural safeguards favored by prisoners would
also impose financial and administrative burdens on the government.
Additional HIV-antibody tests would cost money as would the lawyers
or other qualified experts assisting prisoners in contesting their transfers
to an HIV unit. In addition, at a time when prisons are already notoriously understaffed, present staff members might have to be re-allocated
or new staff members hired to implement a hearing process. Staff members would be needed to review a transfer decision, and if prisoners were
placed in disciplinary segregation if they are found to have violated prison rules or regulations.
Id. at 571-72 n.19.
234. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494, 496 (1980), the Supreme Court held that a prisoner must receive written notice of his or her contemplated transfer to a mental institution.
235. See supra note 226.
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represented at the hearing, staff members would presumably also be
needed to act as proponents for the prison officials.
Other inconveniences would attend added procedural safeguards,
particularly if prisoners could confront and cross-examine laboratory
personnel about the procedures employed during the testing process.
Summoning these people to a hearing would divert them from their important work in the lab and could potentially cause huge backlogs in the
testing process. The end result would be further frustration of the prison
officials' attempts to halt the spread of AIDS in prisons through a segregation policy.
The costs of the safeguards of additional HIV-antibody testing and a
formal hearing before a prisoner's transfer to an HIV unit are therefore
fairly substantial. Yet incursion of these costs may be constitutionally
mandated if the disadvantages of adopting procedural safeguards are outweighed by the advantages. Before conducting a final balancing of the
factors considered under the due process balancing test, however, this
Article will examine the way the Supreme Court has applied the balancing test in several pertinent cases.
4. Supreme Court Cases
In Hewitt v. Helms,2 36 the Supreme Court addressed the question of
the procedural safeguards that must attend a prisoner's transfer to an
administrative segregation unit.237 In Hewitt, the prisoner-plaintiff,
whom authorities suspected of participating in a riot, was transferred to
administrative segregation for two reasons. First, prison officials believed
the prisoner was dangerous and might harm other inmates or correctional staff or otherwise disrupt the security of the institution if he were
allowed to remain in the general prison population unit.238 Second,
prison officials wanted to isolate the prisoner from other inmates while
his suspected role in the riot was investigated.2 39 The prison officials
feared that if the prisoner were allowed to commingle with the other
prisoners during the investigation, he might threaten or harm certain witnesses to the riot to ensure that his role in the riot was not revealed.2 4
In embarking on the balancing analysis, the Supreme Court first
concluded that the private interest at stake, the prisoner's interest in remaining in the general prison population unit, was "not one of great con236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

459 U.S. 460 (1983).
Id. at 462.
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id.
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sequence. ' 24 1 The prisoner was simply being moved from one
"extremely restricted environment" to another.2 42 In addition, the transfer to administrative segregation was neither stigmatizing nor damaging
to the prisoner's parole prospects.24 3
On the other hand, the Court described the governmental interests
served by the prisoner's transfer to administrative segregation as "of
great importance."'2 " The Court characterized the government's responsibility to ensure that correctional officers and inmates are safe as
"perhaps the most fundamental responsibility of the prison administration. ' 245 In addition, the Court deemed "important" the government's
interest in preserving the integrity of an investigation of a prisoner's alleged misconduct.24 6
Turning to the final factor of the due process analysis, the Court
observed that a "detailed adversary proceeding" would not prove helpful
in averting unwarranted transfers of prisoners to administrative segregation. 24 7 The decision to transfer an inmate to administrative segregation
is based on a number of factors, many of which involve predictions about
the future behavior of both the prisoner whose transfer is contemplated
and other prisoners. According to the Court, these subjective evaluations of the temperament of prisoners and predictions about their future
behavior would not be significantly aided by "trial-type procedural safeguards" designed to yield objective factual findings.24 8
What is striking about the Court's analysis in Hewitt is its unacknowledged departure from the due process balancing test as it was
enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge.2 49 In Mathews, the Court said that
the importance of the governmental interests furthered by the government's actions is to be considered under the balancing test. 25 0 But the
Court also said that the extent to which a procedural safeguard will adversely affect these interests is to be weighed in the calculus.2 51
In Hewitt, however, the Court focused only on the centrality of the
government's interests in maintaining institutional security and prevent241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

247. Id. at 473-74.

248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 474.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 335.
Id.
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252
ing the disruption of investigations of prisoners' suspected misconduct.

In doing so, the Court skewed the balancing test against a finding that
certain procedures are constitutionally mandated. For if the sole concern
of this part of the balancing analysis is the importance of the governmental interests furthered by the government's actions, then this factor would
weigh against requiring additional procedural safeguards as long as the
government interest furthered is an important one. But if the impact of a
procedural safeguard on the government were also taken into account,
this factor would weigh in favor of a finding that a safeguard is constitutionally required if the detrimental consequences of implementing this
safeguard were slight.
The Supreme Court further revealed its bias against the prisoner's
due process claim in Hewitt when it discussed the value of additional
procedural safeguards. The Court rejected the notion that a "detailed
adversary proceeding" would prove helpful in averting unwarranted
transfers to administrative segregation.2 53 But focusing on the value of a
"detailed adversary proceeding," which would include a whole mix of
procedural safeguards, masked the question of the value of individual
safeguards in ensuring that the government was not acting arbitrarily or
capriciously. For example, had the Court specifically considered the
value of permitting inmates to appear before the persons making the
transfer decisions to explain why they should not be transferred, the
Court might have found this safeguard of great value in protecting inmates from unfounded transfer decisions. During this personal appearance, inmates could explain why they should not be transferred to
administrative segregation, and the official making the transfer decision
could assess their demeanor and their apparent need for special confinement. By collapsing this procedural safeguard and others into the general category of "detailed adversary proceeding," however, the Court
was able to ignore the value of this and other specific safeguards.
The end result of the Court's skewed application of the due process
balancing test in Hewitt was that the Court concluded that the plaintiff
was entitled to few procedural safeguards surrounding his transfer to administrative segregation.2 54 According to the Court, the prisoner had to
be afforded the protection of only the following procedural safeguards:
(1) notice of the reason for the transfer;2 55 (2) a chance to explain to the
252. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
253. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473-74 (1983); see supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
254. Id. at 476.
255. Id.
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25 6
person making the transfer decision why he should not be transferred;
(3) review of the evidence supporting a transfer by the person making the
25 7
transfer decision within at least a "reasonable time" after the transfer;
and (4) periodic reconsideration of the need for continuing to confine the
prisoner in administrative segregation. 258 Noteworthy among the omitted safeguards was the right of the prisoner to explain in person to the
decisionmaker why a transfer was unwarranted. The Court simply said
that "ordinarily" a written statement from the prisoner would suffice.259
The Court further eviscerated the procedural protections purportedly afforded prisoners when it observed that prisoners may not "necessarily"
have the right even to submit a written statement on the question of the
propriety of their segregative status when their administrative confinement is being periodically reviewed.2 6 °
The Court's niggardly approach to the procedural due process rights
of prisoners in Hewitt is to be contrasted with its generous extension of
procedural rights to inmates in Vitek v. Jones.26 ' In Vitek, the Court
held that before being involuntarily transferred to a mental institution, a
prisoner must be afforded the following procedural protections: (1) written notice that such a transfer is being contemplated; (2) a hearing held a
sufficiently long time after the prisoner received the notice to permit the
inmate to adequately prepare for the hearing; (3) an opportunity to comment at the hearing on the contemplated transfer; (4) the opportunity to
present documentary evidence; (5) the opportunity to call witnesses on
the prisoner's behalf unless "good cause" exists for not affording the inmate this opportunity; (6) the right to confront and cross-examine the
government's witnesses absent "good cause" for prohibiting such confrontation and cross-examination; (7) the making of the transfer decision
by an "independent decisionmaker," someone other than the person who
has recommended the prisoner's transfer to a mental institution; (8) a
written statement by this decisionmaker outlining the reasons for the
transfer and the evidence supporting the transfer decision; (9) assistance
in defending against the transfer from someone who is both "qualified"
262
and "independent;" and (10) notice of the above rights.
In the course of explaining why a prisoner was entitled to such extensive procedural safeguards before being transferred to a mental insti-

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
Id. & n.8.
Id. at 477 n.9.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 477 n.9.
445 U.S. 480 (1980).
Id. at 494-97; id. at 497 (Powell, J., concurring).
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tution, the Court acknowledged that a state has a "strong" interest in
isolating and treating prisoners who are mentally ill.263 This strong interest is counterbalanced, however, by two other factors-the inmate's
"powerful" interest in not being erroneously labelled mentally ill and
subjected to unwanted behavioral modification treatment, and the not
inconsiderable risk that an error will occur when the state is assessing an
inmate's mental health and need for treatment. 2
Unlike Hewitt, the Court in Vitek considered the impact on the state
of the procedural safeguards invoked by the prisoner."' The Court emphasized that the limits that could appropriately be placed on the inmate's rights to call, confront, and cross-examine witnesses minimized
any deleterious impact of the safeguards.2 66 In addition, since the "independent" person making the transfer decision did not have to be an
outsider totally unaffiliated with the prison or hospital, unwarranted interference with the exercise of medical and correctional expertise could
be avoided.26 7
Other Supreme Court cases provide insights in determining the procedural safeguards that must attend a prisoner's transfer to an HIV unit.
Of particular significance is Barry v. Barchi.2 68 In that case, a horsetrainer from New York challenged on due process grounds the summary
suspension of his license after a horse he had trained failed a post-race
drug test. 269 Under a New York statute, the trainer was presumed responsible if drugs were detected in a post-race urinalysis of a horse he or
she had trained.2 70
The plaintiff argued that to suspend his license without first affording him a hearing deprived him of property without due process of
law.2 7 ' The Supreme Court disagreed.27 2 Conceding that the trainer's
interest in not having his license suspended was a substantial one, 2 7 3 the
Court found that two countervailing factors weighed against a finding
that a predeprivation hearing is constitutionally required in this context.
First, the state had a significant interest in maintaining the public's confidence in state-run horse races. The importance of this interest became
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272..
273.

Id. at 495.
Id.
Id. at 496.
Id.
Id.
443 U.S. 55 (1979).
Id. at 61.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 64-66.
Id. at 64.
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accentuated once there was probable cause to believe that a horse had
been drugged and, because of the statutory presumption, that the trainer
had been at least negligent in failing to prevent the drugging.2 74 Second,
once this probable cause existed, the risk of an erroneous suspension of
the trainer's license became sufficiently diminished that a predeprivation
hearing was not constitutionally necessary.27 5
In another case, the Supreme Court stated that due process normally requires no more in terms of predeprivation procedures than what
is necessary to ensure that there is a "reasonably reliable basis" for believing that the facts are what the government has portrayed them to
be. 276 Barry v. Barchiis significant, however, because the Court held that
the horse urine tester's opinion that the sample was positive, in conjunction with the statutory presumption that the trainer either had drugged
the horse or was negligent in failing to prevent such a drugging, provided
a "sufficiently reliable" basis for concluding that the horse had been
277
drugged and that the trainer was responsible for the drugging.
The question raised by the holding in Barry v. Barchi is whether the
opinion of the person who interprets the results of HIV-antibody tests
that a tested inmate is HIV-positive provides a "reasonably reliable basis" for believing that the inmate is in fact infected with the virus. Answering that question requires an examination of information regarding
the reliability of HIV-antibody tests.
5.

The Reliability of HIV-Antibody Tests

Two types of errors can occur in the interpretation of HIV-antibody
test results. First, the laboratory personnel might fail to identify as seropositive someone who is actually a carrier of the AIDS virus. The resulting error is known as a false negative, a positive blood sample mistakenly
reported to be negative for HIV antibodies. The other type of error occurs when the laboratory personnel report that a person is HIV-positive
when in fact the person is not. This type of error is known as a false
positive, the incorrect description of a person as HIV-positive.
The more sensitive an HIV-antibody test is, the fewer false negatives
there will be.2 78 In other words, the sensitivity rate measures the ability
of a test to accurately identify who is HIV-negative. The specificity rate,
on the other hand, refers to the extent to which persons identified as
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 65.
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979).
443 U.S. at 65.
Hearing on AIDS Testing, supra note 32, at 4 (statement of Dr. Lawrence Miike).
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seropositive are in fact seropositive.27 9 The higher the specificity rate of
the antibody tests, the fewer the number of uninfected persons incorrectly identified as HIV-positive.
HIV antibody tests can in theory be quite reliable. When performed
under "optimal laboratory conditions," the ELISA test is at least 99%
accurate in terms of both its sensitivity and its specificity. 2 ° Under ideal
circumstances, the accuracy of the Western blot test is also quite high,

with sensitivity and specificity rates both exceeding

99%.281

In practice, however, the accuracy rates of the tests are often
lower.2 82 Whether there is a problem with false positives or false negatives will depend in large part on the prevalence of HIV in the population
being tested. 28 3 With high-risk populations, persons who are actually
HIV carriers will be more likely to be misidentified as HIV-negative.2 8 4
It has been estimated that when high-risk populations are tested for HIV,
at least one out of ten people tested may be falsely described as HIV285
negative.
With low-risk populations, the recurrent problem is with false positives.2 86 It has been estimated that even if every effort is made to ensure
that an HIV-antibody test is performed and interpreted accurately, for
every fifteen persons in a low-risk population identified as seropositive,
five will be misidentified.28 In other words, five people will actually not
be infected with HIV.
The rate of error in HIV testing has been aggravated by the deficient
performance of testing laboratories. This deficient performance was
highlighted by a string of witnesses who testified before a congressional
subcommittee in October of 1987.288 One of these witnesses, Colonel
Donald S. Burke, the Director of the Army's HIV screening program,
described the performance of a large number of the laboratories conducting HIV-antibody tests as "grossly unacceptable" and "disconcert279. Id.
280. CDC HIV-Antibody Testing Guidelines, supra note 18, at 510; see also Hearing on
AIDS Testing, supra note 32, at 4-5 (statement of Dr. Lawrence Miike) (under optimal conditions, 99.6% sensitivity rate and 99.0% specificity rate).
281. CDC HIV-Antibody Testing Guidelines, supra note 18, at 510; see also Hearing on
AIDS Testing, supra note 32, at 5 (testimony of Dr. Lawrence Miike) (99.6% sensitivity rate
and 99.5% specificity rate).
282. Hearing on AIDS Testing, supra note 32, at 6, 7, 11.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 11.
286. Id. at 6.
287. Id. at 7.
288. Id. at 8, 9.
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ingly substandard. ' 289 He stated that ten out of nineteen laboratories
that had submitted bids to do antibody testing for the Army had at some
point failed to meet the government's proficiency standards. 290 What
was truly alarming was that these proficiency standards were relatively
lax since they permitted one misidentified sample for every twenty
tested. 291
Another witness disclosed that seven of eleven laboratories analyzed
a blood sample from a person diagnosed as having AIDS and failed to
correctly interpret the test results as positive.29 2 Other witnesses testified
about how the inept performance of laboratories exacerbates the problem
with false positives when a low-risk population is tested.2 93 According to
Dr. Lawrence Miike, an AIDS laboratory testing analyst from the Office
of Technology Assessment, the actual performance of HIV-antibody
tests by laboratories has yielded a false positive rate of about 90% when
low-risk populations are tested.29 4
6. Applying the Balancing Test to the Segregation of Supposedly
Seropositive Inmates
As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court in Barry v. Barchi2 9
found no due process problems in immediately suspending the license of
a horsetrainer once a horse that he or she had trained had failed a drug
test. Though correctional officials wishing to avoid procedural constraints when transferring to an HIV unit an inmate who had tested
HIV-positive might cite Barry v. Barchi, the summary suspension of a
horsetrainer's license is clearly distinguishable from the summary placement in an HIV unit of an inmate who has tested seropositive.
To begin with, the interest affected when a prisoner is transferred to
an HIV unit is for several reasons substantially more weighty than the
interest affected when a license to train horses is suspended. First, the
transfer of the inmate implicates a liberty interest, while only a property
interest is affected by the license suspension.2 96 Although property interests are important, the Court has generally considered liberty interests of
even greater importance.2 9 7
289. Id. at 13-14.
290. Id. at 13-14, 16.
291. Id. at 16.
292. Id. at 21-22 (statement of Patricia A. Watson).
293. Id. at 8.
294. Id.
295. 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
296. Id. at 64.
297. Cf. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (indigents have no right to appointed counsel
unless the sanction imposed includes a period of incarceration).
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Second, while the plaintiff in Barry suffered a suspension of his license for only fifteen days,2 98 prisoners transferred to an HIV unit will
remain there for the duration of their confinement, perhaps for many
years or even the rest of their lives. Finally, while the temporary suspension for a short period of time of a horse training license may cause economic hardship and be somewhat stigmatizing, the adverse effects
attending a transfer to an HIV unit are more pervasive. The segregated
prisoner will likely lose or have curtailed a number of different privileges
including work, educational, and recreational opportunities.2 99 The restrictions in these opportunities may in turn adversely affect the inmate's
chances of being released on parole.3" In addition, because of common
misperceptions regarding the communicability of AIDS, the stigma following a transfer to an HIV unit would far exceed the onus accompanying a license suspension, with the latter possibly suggesting no more than
that the horsetrainer was negligent in his or her supervision of a horse.
A second major difference exists between a suspension of a horsetrainer's license because a horse tested positive for drugs and the segregation of an inmate in an HIV unit because the inmate tested positive for
HIV antibodies. In Barry v. Barchi, the Court observed that the state's
interest furthered by the license suspension, its interest in maintaining
the integrity of the horse racing sport, becomes much more substantial
once there is probable cause to believe a horse was drugged.30 1 In Barry,
the substantiality of this interest weighed in favor of the government's
position that few procedural safeguards need attend the initial suspension
of a horsetrainer's license.3 0 2
By contrast, it cannot be said at present that a positive result on an
HIV-antibody test will necessarily establish probable cause to believe the
person tested is infected with the AIDS virus; this probable cause may
indeed be absent even though two ELISA tests and a Western blot have
been performed on a blood sample with the test results all reported as
positive. As discussed earlier, the problem with false positives is particularly acute when low-risk populations are being tested for HIV. 30 3 At
best, up to five out of every fifteen persons in low-risk populations may be
misidentified
as HIV-positive, while at worst, the error rate can approach
90%. 304
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

443 U.S. at 59.
See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
Id.
443 U.S. at 65.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 286-87.

304. See supra text accompanying notes 287, 294.
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Experts agree that the number of persons erroneously reported as
HIV-positive can be greatly reduced if certain quality-control measures
are undertaken to decrease laboratory errors.30 5 Such measures include
regular laboratory inspections, the adoption of performance standards
for laboratories, the adoption of standards for interpreting test results,
and the implementation of a proficiency testing program under which
blood samples with a previously determined HIV status are blind-tested,
and the laboratory results are then compared with the actual results.30 6
Other steps include accrediting laboratories or providing government
funding only to those laboratories meeting certain performance and proficiency standards.3 7
Whether a reportedly positive result on an HIV antibody test will
establish probable cause to believe that the person tested is really seropositive will depend at least in part on whether steps like the ones outlined above have been taken to reduce laboratory errors. If such
measures have not been taken, the risk of error is high, particularly if
low-risk populations are being tested. With the heightening of the risk of
error comes a corresponding diminution in the importance of the government's interest in halting the spread of AIDS in prisons through the segregation of seropositive inmates. In fact, the government's interest in the
effectuation of this purpose would actually be undermined if many HIVpositive inmates escaped detection during the testing process. Prisoners
remaining in the general prison population unit might assume that they
are all or for the most part HIV-free and then engage in the activities
through which HIV could be spread.
Another interest to be considered in the procedural due process balancing analysis is the government's interest in ensuring that inmates that
are truly HIV-positive, and only those inmates, are removed from the
general prison population. While the government always has an interest
in ensuring that the actions it is taking are warranted,30 8 this interest
would seem particularly substantial in this context because of the psychological trauma that attends being publicly identified as HIV-positive.
305. Hearingon AIDS Testing, supra note 32.

306. Id. at 25-27 (statement of James R. Carlson); id. at 34-38 (statement of Dr. Herbert F.
Polesky).
307. Id. at 16 (statement of Colonel Donald S. Burke); id. at 34 (statement of Dr. Herbert
F. Polesky).

308. Cf. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985) (describing as "compelling" the government's interest in an accurate verdict at a criminal trial); Lassiter v. Department of Social
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (state has interest in ensuring that the correct result is reached in
proceedings to terminate parental rights).
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The final difference between the license suspension at issue in Barry
v. Barchi and the segregation of seropositive inmates concerns the third
factor considered under the three-part due process balancing test-the
value of additional safeguards,30 9 in these cases ones preceding the initial
governmental deprivation, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the
private interest at stake if such additional safeguards are not provided.
In Barry, the Court emphasized that a positive result on a drug test created probable cause to believe a horse had been drugged. 10° Consequently, the positive test result provided "substantial assurance" that the
plaintiff's interest in retaining his license was not being "baselessly compromised."3 1' 1 In other words, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of his
license was sufficiently low and the value of additional presuspension
safeguards not that great.
By contrast, as noted earlier, a positive result on an HIV-antibody
test may establish nothing approaching probable cause to believe the person tested is HIV-positive.3" 2 In fact, depending on the prevalency of
HIV in the population being tested and the steps taken to reduce laboratory error, the risk of transferring an uninfected prisoner to an HIV unit
may be very high. 33 Certain safeguards therefore might be valuable in
terms of their ability to avert an unfounded transfer of an uninfected
prisoner to an HIV unit.
The substantiality of the private interest affected by a transfer to an
HIV unit, the diminished importance of the governmental interest purportedly furthered by a transfer policy when the risk of misidentifying
the HIV status of prisoners is high, the countervailing strong governmental interest in ensuring the proper placement of prisoners either inside or
outside an HIV unit, and the potentially high risk of unwarranted transfers of inmates to HIV units together suggest that before prisoners are
segregated because they are supposedly HIV-positive, they are entitled to
more in terms of predeprivation procedural due process than was the
horsetrainer in Barry v. Barchi. What that "more" is may depend on the
circumstances.
If insufficient steps are taken by the authorities to reduce the rate of
errors made by laboratories conducting HIV-antibody tests on blood
samples, prisoners would be entitled to a wide array of procedural safeguards before transfer to an HIV unit. The following procedural safe309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1979).
Id. at 65.
See supra notes 303-04 and accompanying text.
Id.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 17:293

guards probably would satisfy the dictates of due process: (1) notice to
the inmates of the test results and access to those results; (2) a hearing
where the test results could be challenged before an independent decisionmaker, i.e., someone other than the person who conducted the initial
tests; (3) additional tests performed by a different laboratory on a blood
sample drawn from the inmate, and paid for by the government if the
inmate is indigent; (4) the opportunity for the inmate to call witnesses
and present documentary evidence unless "good cause" exists for not
permitting the inmate to do so; (5) the opportunity to confront and crossexamine witnesses on issues such as the procedures followed when determining the inmate's HIV status unless "good cause" exists for not affording the inmate this opportunity; (6) assistance in challenging the validity
of the reportedly positive HIV-antibody test results from someone who is
"independent" and "qualified;" and (7) notification of the rights deline3 14
ated above.
On the other hand, if adequate measures were taken to reduce laboratory errors and if the population tested were at high risk for HIV, a
person would be unlikely to be erroneously labelled HIV-positive. Consequently, other than the procedures designed to limit laboratory errors,
little would be necessary in terms of predeprivation due process except,
of course, that the prisoner be apprised of his or her test results and
receive a copy of those results.
Despite the low risk of an unfounded transfer to an HIV unit, however, the prisoner, once transferred, would be entitled to a postdeprivation hearing held with reasonable promptness, for the purpose of
ensuring that the prisoner was indeed seropositive. Even the horsetrainer
in Barry v. Barchi, who suffered only a 15 day suspension of his license,
was constitutionally entitled, according to the Supreme Court, to a
postdeprivation hearing.3 15 Certainly a prisoner transferred to an HIV
unit who suffers the onus, opprobrium, and loss of privileges attending
such a transfer would be entitled to the same procedural protection.
At the post-transfer hearing, the prisoner would be entitled to the
array of safeguards delineated earlier: an independent decisionmaker;
additional HIV-antibody tests, paid for by the government if the prisoner
is indigent; the limited right to call witnesses, present documentary evidence, and confront and cross-examine witnesses; and assistance from
someone who is "independent" and qualified to assist in challenging the
314. Cf. supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text (discussing procedural safeguards for
prisoner subject to involuntary transfer to mental hospital).
315. 443 U.S. at 66.
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initial test results.3 16 Of particular importance is the latter procedural
safeguard since the technical complexity of HIV-antibody testing would
make it nearly impossible for prisoners to mount a successful challenge
to the validity of certain test results.
The most difficult question regarding the procedural due process
rights of prisoners transferred to HIV units concerns the procedural safeguards that must attend a prisoner's transfer when all adequate measures
have been taken to reduce the error rate of laboratories but the population being tested is at low risk for HIV. As discussed earlier,3 17 with
such a low-risk population, the potential error rate is quite high; even
with steps taken to reduce laboratory errors, up to five of every fifteen
persons identified as HIV-positive may in fact be HIV-negative. 3 1s The
question arises whether in this situation, a hearing must precede the prisoner's transfer to an HIV unit.
Prison officials would cite Barry v. Barchi in support of their contention that such a predeprivation hearing is unnecessary since the Supreme
Court in that case held that a predeprivation hearing was not needed
before a horsetrainer's license was suspended as long as there was probable cause to believe that a horse he had trained had been drugged and
that he was responsible for the drugging.3 1 9 The prison officials would
point out that even with an error rate of about 33%, if a person tested
positive for HIV antibodies, probable cause would exist to believe that
the person was indeed infected with the AIDS virus. The officials would
cite as their authority the determination by the Supreme Court that probable cause will exist as long as there is a "fair probability" or a "substantial chance" that the facts are as contemplated.320
The significance of the private interest at stake, however, distinguishes a prisoner's transfer to an HIV unit from the suspension of a
horsetrainer's license. As Vitek v. Jones suggests, 321 this distinction,
when coupled with the relatively high rate of error in the government's
deprivatory actions, is enough to alter the balance towards a finding that
a predeprivation hearing is constitutionally mandated. In Vitek, no
doubt there was at least probable cause to believe that the inmate was
mentally ill and in need of hospitalization outside the prison once a psychiatrist or psychologist had certified the existence of these facts. In addition, the transfer of mentally ill prisoners to mental hospitals for
316. See supra text accompanying note 314.
317. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
318. Id.
319. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 65 (1979).
320. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 244 n.13 (1983).
321. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
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needed mental health treatment furthers several important governmental
interests: the meeting of the health care needs of the ill prisoners, the
protection of other inmates who might be endangered if the mental illnesses of some prisoners were untreated, and the maintenance of institutional security. Nonetheless, the significance of the private interest
affected by such an institutional transfer and the risk of error attending
psychiatric diagnoses convinced the Court that the transfer must be preceded not only by a hearing, but by a hearing accompanied by an array of
procedural safeguards.3 22
Similarly, it would seem, prisoners would be entitled to a
predeprivation hearing before their transfer to an HIV unit when there is
a risk that the transfer of up to one-third of the prisoners whose transfer
is being contemplated is unwarranted. Before or at this hearing, the inmates would have the rights discussed earlier: to present evidence, confront and cross-examine witnesses, receive assistance, and have
additional HIV antibody tests conducted.32 3
Conclusion
The inclination of many people confronted with the problem of
AIDS is to banish persons known to be afflicted with the AIDS virus
from their environs. Parents demand that HIV-positive students be removed from the schools, employers summarily fire employees known to
be or suspected of being HIV-positive, and children infected with the
virus, whose parents are unable to care for them, often languish in hospitals, unwanted by prospective adoptive or foster parents.
This seeming callousness is really the product of fear, fear that
springs from ignorance about AIDS and the ways that HIV is transmitted. To the extent that the government capitulates to this fear and treats
groups of seropositive persons, such as all seropositive inmates, as pariahs, it will encourage and perpetuate unfounded notions about the
disease.
Ironically, a policy of segregating all inmates who test positive for
HIV antibodies from the rest of the prison population may actually facilitate rather than curb the spread of HIV among prisoners. Prisoners who
remain in the general prison population, left with the false impression
that they are all HIV-free, may more readily engage in the types of activities through which the virus is spread.
322. Id. at 494-97.
323. See supra text accompanying note 316.
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Should the government ignore these arguments against a segregation
policy and persist in adopting such a policy, however, the constitutional
ramifications of the policy would have to be considered. One question
concerns the extent to which, if at all, prisoners must be afforded, under
the Due Process Clause, the benefit of procedural safeguards designed to
ensure that the prisoner transferred is indeed seropositive.
Before answering this question, one must inquire whether inmates
transferred to an HIV unit are deprived of a liberty interest within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause. Although a liberty interest may not
normally, according to the Supreme Court,32 4 be implicated by a prisoner's transfer to an administrative segregation unit, the transfer of a
prisoner to an HIV unit is different from other generic forms of administrative segregation. The transferred prisoner will be substantially stigmatized by being labelled a carrier of the AIDS virus and most likely will
suffer the loss of privileges normally attending administrative confinement for a much longer period of time than occurs when an inmate is
subjected to other forms of administrative segregation. This loss of privileges, including curtailed work and educational opportunities, may in
turn drastically impair the prisoner's chances of being released on parole.
In short, as with the transfer of an inmate to a mental institution, the
transfer of a prisoner to an HIV unit fundamentally alters the nature of
the inmate's confinement, thereby implicating a constitutionally derived
liberty interest.
A prisoner transferred to an HIV unit, in any event, may have been
deprived of a liberty interest derived from state law. If transfer to an
HIV unit were contingent, under the state's statutes or regulations, upon
a finding of HIV-positivity, prisoners would have more than a "unilateral
expectation" that they would not be transferred to an HIV unit unless
they were seropositive;3 25 they would have an "'objective expectation,
firmly fixed in state law and official Penal Complex practice'" that such
a transfer would not occur unless this predicate condition were met.3 26
According to the Supreme Court, this "objective expectation" would be
enough to give rise to a liberty interest falling within the protection of the
Due Process Clause.32 7
The next question is what "process" or procedural safeguards must
be afforded a prisoner transferred to an HIV unit. While the Supreme
324. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983).
325. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
326. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489-90 (1980) (quoting Miller v. Vitek, 437 F.Supp. 569,
572-73 (D. Neb. 1977)).
327. Id.
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Court has required that only minimal safeguards attend a prisoner's
transfer to administrative segregation, 328 a transfer to an HIV unit is different, in terms of both the centrality of the private interest affected by
the transfer and the risk that the transfer is unfounded. The due process
balancing test therefore points towards affording greater procedural protection when prisoners are transferred to HIV units.
What that protection must actually entail will depend on the circumstances. If government officials have taken adequate measures to
limit laboratory errors and if the prison population being tested is at high
risk for HIV, a summary transfer to an HIV unit might be constitutional
as long as two conditions have been met: first, an expert has reported
that the inmate tested positive on two ELISA tests and a Western blot,
and second, the inmate has been notified of and given a copy of the test
results. Soon after the inmate's transfer to the HIV unit, however, a
hearing would have to be held on the question of his or her HIV status.
At this hearing, the inmate would have a number of rights, including the
right to present the testimony of witnesses and documentary evidence
absent good cause for not permitting the inmate to do so, the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses unless there was good cause for
forbidding such confrontation and cross-examination, and the right to
assistance in contesting the HIV results from someone who is "independent" and qualified to provide such assistance. In addition, the inmate
would have the right to have additional tests performed on a newly
drawn blood sample and to receive notice of all of the above rights.
On the other hand, if the government failed to guard adequatqly
against laboratory errors, due process would require that the hearing,
with its attendant procedural safeguards, precede the transfer to the HIV
unit. In addition, if the government did all that could be done to reduce
the rate of laboratory errors in interpreting HIV-antibody test results, the
risk of being erroneously identified as HIV-positive would be quite high if
the prevalence of the HIV in the population being tested was low. As
discussed earlier, up to five of every fifteen persons might be misidentified
as seropositive3 2 9 In this situation, it would seem, due process also
would dictate a pretransfer hearing.
In the fight against AIDS, government officials can do more to combat the spread of HIV. The challenge for the government, however, is to
resist harebrained ideas that have surface appeal but that will actually
undermine the government's efforts to curtail the spread of the virus.
Should government officials succumb to demands to segregate all HIV328. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476-77.
329. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
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positive prisoners in special units, however, and should this segregation
policy otherwise comport with the Constitution, the government will still
have to set up adequate procedures to ensure that inmates are not arbitrarily placed in an HIV unit. While meeting the challenge of doing
more to fight AIDS, the government can do no less than the Constitution
demands.

